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ABSTRACT
Under the law of lost evidence, absent a showing of bad faith, no due
process violation occurs when the police lose potentially exculpatory
evidence. This is so even though the evidence may be critical to the
defense and even though post-conviction DNA testing has exonerated
more than 200 individuals. Ironically, the case that developed that rule of
law, Arizona v. Youngblood, is founded on the conviction of an innocent
man.
This Article critically examines Youngblood and provides a conceptual
framework for examining the constitutional right of access to evidence.
Supreme Court precedent reflects two different, sometimes competing,
visions of procedural due process: adjudicative fairness to the accused or
an instrumental focus on deterring official misconduct. In Youngblood,
instrumentalism trumped adjudicative fairness.
Moreover, four
compelling developments in the twenty-one years since Youngblood was
decided—scientific advances, legislative reform, state judicial
disapproval, and doctrinal incoherence—have eroded its rationale and
legitimacy.
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For all those reasons, Youngblood no longer merits stare decisis effect
and should be overruled. In its place, the Court should apply an approach
that takes into account the nature of the government’s conduct and the
degree of prejudice suffered by the accused. This approach restores
balance to the constitutional right of access to evidence; it encompasses a
broader vision of due process that promotes adjudicative fairness. In
some cases, the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence ought to result in
a due process violation, even in the absence of bad faith.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable cases in the annals of constitutional
criminal procedure is Arizona v. Youngblood.1 Absent a showing of bad
faith, the Due Process Clause is not violated when the police lose or
destroy potentially exculpatory physical evidence.2 Youngblood is a
seminal case on the law of lost evidence and has critical implications in
cases involving unexamined DNA samples. The loss of such evidence,
even though it may preclude a claim of actual innocence, cannot result in a
due process violation unless the accused shows that the police acted in bad
faith. This is so despite the fact that forensic DNA typing has exonerated
more than 200 individuals, all of whom had been convicted of serious
crimes (including sexual assault and homicide), and some of whom had
been sentenced to death.3
Youngblood has long been controversial.4 Now, two decades after it
was decided, it must be critically re-examined. Ironically, the rule of law
established by the case was founded upon the conviction of an innocent
man.5 Youngblood was convicted of abducting and sexually assaulting a
child in 1985. Fifteen years later, in 2000, he was exonerated through

1. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
2. Id. at 58.
3. Innocence Project, Innocence Project Case Profiles, http://www.innocence project.org/know
(last visited Dec. 3, 2008); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(2008) (empirical analysis of how the criminal justice system handled the cases of the first 200
individuals exonerated through DNA testing).
4. For critical commentary, see Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1566 (1995) (calling the ambiguous definition of bad
faith “significant”); Daniel R. Dinger, Note, Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance to Prosecute?:
State Rejections of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 27 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 329, 364–67 (2000) (noting problems with a bad faith litmus test); The Supreme Court, 1988
Term—Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 157 (1989) (arguing that “[t]he majority, by adopting a
subjective ‘bad faith’ test and by placing the burden of proof on the defendant, needlessly weakened
. . . constitutional assurances”); Matthew H. Lembke, Note, The Role of Police Culpability in Leon and
Youngblood, 76 VA. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1990) (criticizing “inherently flawed” opinion in
Youngblood because focusing on police bad faith—and not the materiality of the destroyed evidence—
“gives inadequate protection to the rights of the defendant to fundamental fairness”); Recent
Developments—Arizona v. Youngblood, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 529 (1989) (faulting bad
faith standard as “both theoretically unsound and a serious erosion of protections for criminal
defendants”).
5. Or, as Peter Neufeld, the co-founder and director of the Innocence Projects put it:
In law school, we have been taught that, absent bad faith, the destruction of critical evidence
will not be deemed prejudicial. As a result, there has been no requirement that law
enforcement agencies use due diligence to preserve evidence. This doctrine rested for more
than a decade on the shoulders of an innocent man.
Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 639, 646 (2001).
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DNA testing that was unavailable at the time of his trial.6 Biological
material that could not be tested effectively under the relatively primitive
forensic science of the 1980s nevertheless held the promise of future
exculpation. Moreover, the DNA evidence that exonerated Youngblood
led to the 2002 conviction of the actual perpetrator, an individual with two
prior convictions for child sex abuse.7
Youngblood can be examined through several different prisms.
Certainly, it can be viewed as part of a broader, historical shift from the
Warren Court’s interpretation of criminal procedure to that of the
Rehnquist Court.8 Alternatively, to the extent one accepts the notion that
criminal procedure has two normative models—due process and crime
control—Youngblood can be regarded as furthering the purposes of crime
control.9 Youngblood can also be seen as having been influenced by
contemporaneous developments in other areas of the law, including limits

6. Barbara Whitaker, DNA Frees Inmate Years After Justice Rejected Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2000, at A12. Youngblood’s exoneration led to criticism of the Court’s ruling, as well as calls for
greater post-conviction DNA testing and criminal justice reform. See id. (quoting Dr. Edward Blake, a
forensic scientist with expertise in DNA, “For those organizations that are poorly run or mismanaged
or don’t give a damn, the Youngblood case was a license to let down their guard and be lazy. The
effect generally was to lower the standards of evidence collection.”); Larry Hammond & John
Stookey, Scrutiny a Must in Criminal Cases Commission Would Ensure Justice, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan.
30, 2002, at 9B (advocating the creation of state commission to examine cases involving the wrongly
convicted); Tim O’Brien, Reasonable Doubt and DNA, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2000, at A25
(advocating greater access to post-conviction DNA testing); A Mishandling of Justice, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 12, 2000, at 16A (“Youngblood’s story is as old as the common law itself:
Bad facts make bad law. In 1988 six justices dispensed with principle in order to keep a man they
thought had committed a depraved act behind bars. Instead, their ends-justifies-the-means justice
landed an innocent man in prison for years and gave the police the green light to mishandle key
evidence without consequence.”).
7. David L. Teibel, Man Gets 24 Years in ’83 Child Sex Case, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 20, 2002,
at 5C.
8. For commentary that compares the two Courts, see 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C.
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.04, at 18–19 (4th ed. 2006) (“With the
appointment of Justice Kennedy, the balance of power definitively tipped in favor of the crime control
model of criminal justice, and the Court increasingly cut back on the holdings of the Warren Court
era.”); Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337,
1358 (2002) (“Instead of overruling Warren Court precedents it deemed to be erroneous, the Rehnquist
Court has distinguished, created exceptions to, and reinterpreted such precedents.”); Carol S. Steiker,
Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 2466, 2468 (1996) (noting that “the [Rehnquist] Court has clearly become less sympathetic to
claims of individual rights and more accommodating to assertions of the need for public order”).
9. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–73 (1968) (asserting
that criminal procedure has two normative models, the “Due Process Model” and the “Crime Control
Model”). For a critique of Packer’s influential conception of criminal procedure, see Peter Arenella,
Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing
Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 211 (1983) (“Taken at face value, Packer’s two ‘models’ appear to
describe in an overly simplified and dichotomized form how our system determines guilt by
adversarial trial adjudication or by plea bargaining.”).
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on the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule10 and the reach of the Due
Process Clause in constitutional tort claims.11
This Article, however, examines Youngblood’s conception of
procedural due process. Youngblood represents the triumph of one vision
of due process over another in criminal cases involving the constitutional
right of access to evidence.12 Prior to Youngblood, the Supreme Court had
taken into account two different, sometimes conflicting interests served by
due process: adjudicative fairness to the accused and an instrumental
emphasis on deterring official misconduct.13 Adjudicative fairness focuses
on the individual and the individual’s liberty interest; this vision of due
process manifests itself in an examination of the materiality of evidence or
prejudice to the accused. The instrumental vision of due process is more
limited in its approach; the focus is on the state, not the individual. Due
process imposes a restraint on the state, the point of which is to punish the
state for official misconduct or bad faith. In emphasizing instrumentalism
to the exclusion of adjudicative fairness, Youngblood broke with precedent
and adopted an unduly narrow view of due process.
In critiquing that narrow view of due process, this Article studies the
twenty years of legal and factual developments that have occurred since
Youngblood was decided. The very facts of Youngblood reveal the flaws
inherent in its conception of due process by illustrating how a faulty
doctrine can lead to conviction of the innocent. Four powerful currents

10. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (recognizing good faith exception to
exclusionary rule when officer objectively and reasonably relies on a defective warrant); Lembke,
supra note 4, at 1230–31 (describing similarities between Youngblood and Fourth Amendment
precedent).
11. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986);
Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 35, 95 n.300 (2005) (noting “the role that tort law conceptions of fault play in civil versus
criminal procedure constitutional rights”); Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 537 (“The motivebased test in Youngblood is part of a recent trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence toward making bad
faith the dispositive feature in a number of constitutional claims.”).
12. The author owes this insight to Professor Michael B. Browde.
13. Commentators have devised other models that more broadly discuss the values served by due
process in a civil context. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10–7, at 666–
67, § 10–18, at 753 (2d ed. 1998) (describing two competing visions of procedural due process in
which one serves an “intrinsic value” of assuring participation to further individual dignity and the
other is “instrumental” in using participation to promote accuracy); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 243 (2004) (noting three models of procedural justice in a civil
context, including the “accuracy model,” the “balancing model,” and the “participation model”);
Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
193, 201–02 (1992) (in context of claim preclusion, discussing outcome-oriented participation or
instrumental theories and process-oriented participation or intrinsic participation theories). Professor
Tribe notes that “[i]n specialized settings, such as those of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed a right of access to courts.” TRIBE, supra, § 10-18, at 753.
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have eroded Youngblood’s bad faith standard: scientific advances,
legislative reform, state judicial disapproval, and doctrinal incoherence.
When Youngblood was charged in 1983, forensic DNA typing did not
exist. This science was in its infancy when the Supreme Court decided the
case in 1988.14 Since that time, courts have routinely accepted DNA
evidence, and DNA testing has become more sensitive, sophisticated,
cheaper, and quicker.
This advance in forensic science, in turn, has sparked legislative
reform. In recognition of the power of DNA testing to exonerate the
accused, forty-three states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have passed innocence protection acts.15 These laws vary
widely in scope and coverage, but many require the preservation of DNA
evidence.16 Ten state supreme courts have also rejected the bad faith

14. See George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and
Federal Court, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2478–86 (1997) (describing admissibility of DNA
evidence in state and federal courts).
15. See Innocence Project, Reforms by State, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/
LawView2.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2008); Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost:
The Preservation of Biological Evidence under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1239, 1249 & n.49 (2005); see also Federal Innocence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3600A (Supp.
2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240(H) (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-104(A) to (B)(1)
(2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9(a) (WEST 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102jj(b) (2004); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2005); D.C. CODE § 22-4134(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. § 925.11(4)(a) (2006);
GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(C)(10) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-126 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-4902 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116–4(a) (2004); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14(1) (2004); IOWA
CODE § 81.10 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(b)(2) (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.140
(West 2006); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1(H)(1)–(5) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2138(14) (2004); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(1)–(2) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 770.16 (11) (2004); MINN. STAT. § 590.01–.06 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.056 (2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-21-111 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120(3)–(4) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.0918(3) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-D:2(II) (2006); N.J STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32a
(2005); N.M. STAT. § 31-1A-2(L) (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2005);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-15 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2953.71–.81 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1372(A) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.005 (West
2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1(b)(2) (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-11(a) (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-30-309 (2004); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.39(a) (VERNON 2005); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-9-301(5) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(A) (2004); V.T. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 5566; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(6) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-14 (2005); WIS. STAT.
§ 974.07(5) (2004).
16. See Jones, supra note 15, at 1255, 1255 nn.81–82 (describing states that impose a “blanket”
duty to preserve evidence). For jurisdictions that impose such a duty, see 18 U.S.C. § 3600A(a); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-104(a) to (b)(1) (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54102jj(b); D.C. CODE § 22-4134(a); FLA. STAT. § 925.11(4)(a); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116–4(a); IOWA
CODE § 81.10; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.140; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(14); MD. CODE
ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(1)–(2); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (11); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.056;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-111; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-D:2(II); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1372(A); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-11(a); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art.
38.39(a).
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standard in interpreting due process as a matter of state constitutional
law.17 In all, a majority of states have either passed innocence protection
acts requiring the preservation of DNA evidence or rejected Youngblood’s
bad faith standard as a matter of state constitutional law.
Incoherence characterizes post-Youngblood case law decided in state
and lower federal courts. There are significant disparities in the ways in
which courts have interpreted fundamental aspects of Youngblood,
including the meaning of “bad faith,” whether the lost evidence must be
potentially exculpatory or possess apparent exculpatory value to establish
a due process violation, and what remedy is available in the event of a
violation.18 Regardless of the approach used, the bad faith standard
imposes an almost insurmountable burden upon the accused. Over the past
two decades, only a handful of courts have found due process violations.19
Taken as a whole, those developments have so undermined
Youngblood’s rationale and legitimacy that it no longer merits stare decisis
effect. In place of the bad faith standard, a better, more balanced approach
would take into account the overriding concern of due process:
adjudicative fairness. Thus, a court would assess both police culpability
and the materiality of the lost evidence or prejudice suffered by the
accused.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of
Youngblood: the facts of the case, the deliberations and decision of the

17. See Ex Parte Gingo, 605 So.2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992); Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557, 565–
68 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Thorne v. Dep’t Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330–32 (Alaska 1989); State
v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 592–94 (Conn. 1995); Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 959–60 (Del. 1992);
Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 85–89 (Del. 1989); State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80, 98–99 (Haw.
1995); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 496–97 (Mass. 1991); State v. Smagula, 578
A.2d 1215, 1217 (N.H. 1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 914–18 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Delisle,
648 A.2d 632, 642–43 (Vt. 1994); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 507–14 (W. Va. 1995).
18. Compare State v. O’Dell, 46 P.3d 1074, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A] determination of
bad faith ‘must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at
the time it was lost or destroyed.’”) (internal citations omitted), with Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498,
509 (Fla. 2003) (“[B]ad faith exists only when police intentionally destroy evidence they believe
would exonerate a defendant.”); compare United States v. Day, 697 A.2d 31, 36 (D.C. 1997)
(dismissal the appropriate sanction under Youngblood), with Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d 783, 793 (Idaho
1995) (“In a criminal case, application of a favorable inference under the spoliation doctrine is the
appropriate remedy for a Youngblood due process violation.”).
19. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 6.8 (Supp. 2005) (“[O]nly a
handful of decisions have found that the bad faith standard is met.”); Elizabeth A. Bawden, Here
Today, Gone Tomorrow—Three Common Mistakes Courts Make When Police Lose or Destroy
Evidence with Apparent Exculpatory Value, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 350 (2000) (“[T]here are a very
limited number of cases where courts have found the presence of bad faith.”); Jones, supra note 15, at
1246 (“In the years since Youngblood, the requirement of demonstrating ‘bad faith’ has proven to be
an almost insurmountable burden in establishing a due process violation based on the destruction of
evidence.”).
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Supreme Court, a discussion of the case’s significance, and a postscript on
what happened to Youngblood after the decision. This part provides a
conceptual framework for examining Supreme Court precedent involving
the constitutional right of access to evidence. Youngblood reflects the
tension between two competing visions of procedural due process, with
one vision of due process prevailing to the exclusion of another. Part II
critiques Youngblood. This part discusses developments in DNA testing
since Youngblood was decided, decisions of state supreme courts that have
rejected the bad faith standard as a matter of state constitutional law, the
passage of innocence protection acts at the state and federal level, and the
incoherence in the law that has resulted as courts have applied
Youngblood. Part III considers arguments in favor of Youngblood. Part IV
resolves the arguments for and against Youngblood by concluding that, on
balance, it should be overturned. In some cases, even in the absence of bad
faith by the police, the destruction of physical evidence ought to result in a
due process violation.
I. A DISCUSSION OF ARIZONA V. YOUNGBLOOD
In light of Youngblood’s importance in this area of constitutional
criminal procedure, it is worth taking the time to unpack the case. Part I.A
outlines the facts of the case. Part I.B describes what happened at the
Supreme Court, including the oral argument, the Court’s post-argument
conference, and the resulting majority opinion, separate concurrence, and
dissent. Here, the papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at the Manuscript
Division of the Library of Congress provide valuable insights into the
views of the Justices.20 Part I.C explores Youngblood’s significance and
conceptualizes the due process interests at issue in cases involving the
constitutional right of access to evidence. Part I.D provides a postscript on
what happened to Youngblood after the Supreme Court decided his case.

20. The Papers of Harry A. Blackmun consist of almost 1600 boxes of material at the Library of
Congress. His papers have been open to the public since March 2004. See The Papers of Harry A.
Blackmun, Library of Congress [hereinafter Blackmun Papers] (relevant sections on file with author);
see Press Release, The Library of Congress, Papers of Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Opened for Research at Library of Congress (Mar. 4, 2004), available at http://www.loc.gov/today/
pr/2004/04-041.html. The author thanks Kevin Kearney, Justice Blackmun’s law clerk on Youngblood,
for his assistance in reviewing the Justice’s files and for sharing his insights and recollections. The
papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall are also at the Library of Congress, but they were less helpful
than Justice Blackmun’s papers.
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A. Background
On October 29, 1983, David L., a 10-year-old boy, attended church
with his mother.21 After leaving the church around 9:30 p.m., he went to a
carnival behind the church.22 There, he was abducted by a middle-aged
black man of medium height and weight.23 David, who was described as a
“very observant youngster,” later testified that his assailant was named
“Damian” or “Carl” and had greasy grey hair, facial hair, no facial scars,
and one unusual distinguishing characteristic—a right eye that was almost
completely white.24 The assailant wore brown leather or plastic loafers and
drove a white, medium-sized, two-door sedan with a noisy muffler and an
inoperable passenger door.25 The car started with an ordinary ignition key,
and country music played on the radio.26 For the next hour-and-a-half, the
assailant molested the child in a secluded area near a ravine and in an
“unidentified, sparsely furnished house.”27 Eventually, the assailant
returned the boy to the carnival and threatened to kill him if he told
anyone.28
David made his way home, and his mother brought him to a hospital.29
A doctor treated the boy for rectal injuries and used a sexual assault kit to
collect evidence of the attack.30 Among other things, the doctor used a
swab to collect samples from the boy’s rectum and mouth, made a
microscopic slide of the samples, and obtained samples of the boy’s saliva,
blood, and hair.31 The Tucson police placed the kit in a refrigerator at the
police station.32 They also collected David’s underwear and t-shirt but
neglected to refrigerate or freeze them.33 Ten days after the assault, on
November 8, 1983, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit
and determined that sexual contact had occurred.34
There were significant discrepancies between David’s description of
his assailant and Larry Youngblood. Youngblood was a 30-year-old

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 52 (1988).
Id.
State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51.
Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 592.
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 593.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53.
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African-American male, but he had dry hair, not greasy hair.35 His hair
was black, not grey.36 He also had a scar on his forehead.37 Although he
had a bad eye, it was his left eye, not his right one.38 Youngblood wore
laced shoes, not loafers, and walked with a noticeable limp caused by a
foot injury received in an automobile accident when he was a child.39 He
always wore glasses in public.40 His sister and her two sons testified that
he never listened to country music.41 Youngblood had been diagnosed as
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, but his psychiatrist testified that
there was “very, very little evidence of sociopathy,” and no information to
suggest sexual deviancy.42
There were also discrepancies between David’s description of the
assailant’s car and Youngblood’s car. Youngblood owned a white 1964
Chrysler Imperial, but it had four doors not two.43 Youngblood and others
testified that the car did not run at the time of the assault; it lacked even a
battery.44 When operable, the car ran quietly45 and started with a
screwdriver, not a key.46 The radio did not work.47 Moreover, a police
examination of the car failed to reveal any of David’s fingerprints, hair, or
clothing fibers; only Youngblood’s fingerprints were found.48
David’s identification of Youngblood was also problematic. Nine days
after the assault, a police detective took a taped statement from David, told
him an arrest had been made, and asked him to pick the assailant out of a
photographic array.49 Three of the photographs had the left eye whited out;
three had the right eye whited out. On the night of the assault, as well as
on the day David first viewed the photographs, he was not wearing his

35. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 593 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759, 765 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d, 844 P.2d 1152
(Ariz. 1993).
42. Id. Youngblood had a prior criminal record that included convictions for aggravated assault
and armed robbery. See Patty Machelor, DNA Clears Man in Sex Case after 15 Years, TUCSON
CITIZEN, Aug. 10, 2000, at 1A.
43. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 593.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 594. Unfortunately, the police disposed of Youngblood’s vehicle without giving notice
to him or his defense counsel and without determining whether or not the radio worked, a key turned
the ignition switch, the muffler was noisy, or the car was even operable. Id. at 593.
49. Id. at 594.
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glasses.50 David held the photographs very close to his face, selected
Youngblood’s photograph, and said he was “pretty sure.”51 Later, he
identified another man in the array as his possible assailant.52
The police obtained an arrest warrant for Youngblood on December 7,
1983.53 He was arrested two days later.54 Shortly thereafter, Youngblood’s
counsel filed a competency motion. In August 1984, Youngblood was
found competent to stand trial.55 In October 1984, the trial court denied the
State’s motion to compel Youngblood to provide blood and saliva because
the State failed to show that it had obtained sufficient samples from the
victim to warrant comparison.56 The police criminologist performed an
ABO test on the rectal swab, but was unable to determine the presence of a
blood group substance.57
Youngblood’s first trial in December 1984 ended in a mistrial; the jury
deadlocked six to six.58 The criminologist examined the victim’s clothing
in January 1985. Unfortunately, by then semen samples on the clothing
had deteriorated to the point where they were of little use under the
forensic analyses then available.59 The police could no longer ascertain the
blood type of the assailant or whether he secreted a blood-type marker into
bodily fluids such as semen.60
At Youngblood’s retrial, the trial court gave the jury a missing
evidence instruction, which allowed the jury to draw an adverse inference
against the State if it found the State had lost or destroyed evidence.61 The
trial lasted four days. After ninety-five minutes of deliberation, the jury
convicted Youngblood of child molestation, sexual assault, and
kidnapping. The court imposed concurrent sentences of ten-and-one-half
years of imprisonment.62 Youngblood appealed to the Arizona Court of

50. Id. David’s vision problem, however, was apparently fairly mild. His optometrist testified
that even without glasses, David could “still see faces clearly, obtain an Arizona’s driver’s license, and
play ball.” Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.7, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (No. 86-1904).
51. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 594.
52. Id. At trial, Youngblood presented an alibi defense. His former girlfriend testified that when
she returned home at 10:00 p.m., Youngblood was asleep on a living room sofa. Her home was a 30 to
45 minute drive from the place where the child was abducted. Id.
53. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (No. 86-1904).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5–6.
58. State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d, 844 P.2d 1152 (Ariz.
1993).
59. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 68 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 54.
62. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51; Mark
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Appeals on the theory that the State’s failure to preserve the evidence had
violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.63
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. “[W]hen identity is an
issue at trial and the police permit the destruction of evidence that could
eliminate a defendant as the perpetrator, such loss is material to the
defense and is a denial of due process.”64 Timely testing of properly
preserved semen samples on the victim’s clothing could have exonerated
Youngblood.65 The Court of Appeals did not find bad faith on the part of
the State, but relied upon Brady v. Maryland66 to “acknowledge the right
of an accused to a fair trial: the dismissal is necessary in order to avoid an
unfair trial, not as punishment for any inaction by the [S]tate.”67
The Arizona Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for review.68
The State then petitioned for certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. Certiorari was granted “to consider the extent to which the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to
preserve evidentiary material that might be useful to a criminal
defendant.”69
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The case was argued on October 11, 1988.70 At oral argument, the State
spent most of its time responding to factual questions from the Justices:
what was tested and when, what was not tested and why, what tests were
available, and what the tests revealed.71 The State did not contend that the
presence or absence of bad faith was outcome dispositive; that claim was

Kimble, Kimble Column, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 24, 2000, at 5A. At the re-trial defense counsel did
not call Youngblood’s sister, psychiatric social worker, or psychiatrist. The Arizona Court of Appeals
believed that “[counsel’s] actions present[ed] a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Youngblood, 790 P.2d at 765. Carol Wittels, Youngblood’s defense lawyer, made the tactical decision
not to introduce evidence of his mental illness for fear of prejudicing the jury against him. Telephone
Interview with Carol Wittels (Jan. 15, 2008).
63. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 592.
64. Youngblood, 790 P.2d at 596 (quoting State v. Escalante, 734 P.2d 597, 603 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986)).
65. Id. at 596–97.
66. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
67. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 596.
68. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988).
69. Id. at 52.
70. Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1. For an audiotape and transcript of the
argument, see Transcript of Petitioner’s Oral Argument, Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (No. 86-1904),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_86_1904/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
71. Transcript of Petitioner’s Oral Argument, supra note 70.
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made, almost in passing, in the State’s brief.72 The questioning of
Youngblood’s counsel, however, was telling. Justice O’Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist focused on the absence of bad faith.73 The Chief Justice
worried about the extent of any duty recognized under the Due Process
Clause, asking “How broad is this duty? Is the Constitution going to tell
prosecutors how they ought to investigate cases?”74
Three days later, on October 14, 1988, the Justices conferred.75 The
vote was six to three to reverse the Arizona Court of Appeals.76 Chief
Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O’Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy in the majority.77 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.78
According to Justice Blackmun’s handwritten notes of the conference,
the majority focused on the overall fairness of the proceedings and the
State’s lack of bad faith.79 Chief Justice Rehnquist commented, “Our cases
do not go so far as Arizona courts said. . . . Due Process [does] not require
this [result].”80 Justice White thought that before the State could be
charged with a due process violation there should be a suspect. There was
none in the six-week period from the time of the assault to Youngblood’s
arrest, when the clothing was unrefrigerated and the semen samples had
deteriorated.81 The State was negligent at most.82 For Justice O’Connor,
the trial was not unfair; there was no evidence of bad faith. The defendant
was trying to have it both ways, for the loss of evidence had allowed him
to argue that the State had failed to carry the burden of proof. Justices
Scalia and Kennedy also noted the lack of bad faith.83

72. Brief for Petitioner at 28, Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (No. 86-1904).
73. Transcript of Respondent’s Oral Argument, Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (No. 86-1904),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_86_1904/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
74. Id.
75. Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1, Notes of Conference (Oct. 14, 1988).
76. Id. at 1–2.
77. Id. According to his notes, Justice Blackmun would have denied certiorari, for the case was,
in his view, a “fact-specific applic[ation] o[f] t[he] materiality requi[re]ment of Trombetta.” Blackmun
Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1 (July 18, 1988).
78. Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1, Notes of Conferences 1–2 (Oct. 14,
1988).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1.
81. According to Youngblood’s counsel, without refrigeration, the ABO blood markers would
have deteriorated over a two-to-three week period. Transcript of Respondent’s Oral Argument, supra
note 73; Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1, Notes of Conference 1 (Oct. 14, 1988).
82. Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1, Notes of Conference 1 (Oct. 14, 1988).
83. Id. at 2.
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For Justice Stevens, it was a “close” case.84 He found it significant that
the trial court had instructed the jury that it could draw an adverse
inference against the State based on the lost evidence. In his view, looking
at the trial “as a whole,” there was no unfairness; the State’s negligence
should not lead to dismissal.85
In conference, the dissenters argued that due process required more of
the State. According to Justice Brennan, the State did not have to perform
all available tests. But, the evidence here obviously had the potential to be
exculpatory. When the State collected evidence, it had a duty to preserve
it.86 Justice Marshall agreed, citing Brady v. Maryland.87 One of Justice
Blackmun’s handwritten notes put it succinctly: “Fair trial is our
measure.”88 Justice Brennan asked Justice Blackmun to author the
dissent,89 and Justice Blackmun agreed to do so.90
The six-to-three split among the Justices did not change after the
conference. Chief Justice Rehnquist circulated the first draft of his opinion
on October 27, 1988.91 Justice Stevens decided to concur separately in the
judgment.92 Justice Blackmun circulated his dissent on November 22,
1988.93 On November 29, 1988, the Court issued its opinion, reversing the
Arizona Court of Appeals.94
Consistent with views expressed in conference, the Rehnquist majority
held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the
police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
denial of due process of law.”95 The Court distinguished Brady on the
ground that the evidence there was known to be favorable to the accused.
In contrast, in Youngblood, the evidence was only potentially exculpatory.
“We think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id.
88. Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1 (Sept. 25, 1988).
89. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Blackmun, Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 512,
Folder 10 (Oct. 14, 1988).
90. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan, Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 512,
Folder 10 (Oct. 14, 1988).
91. Chief Justice Rehnquist, First Draft of Opinion in Arizona v. Youngblood, Blackmun Papers,
supra note 20, Box 512, Folder 10 (Oct. 27, 1988).
92. Justice Stevens, First Draft of Concurrence in the Judgment, Blackmun Papers, supra note
20, Box 512, Folder 10 (Nov. 16, 1988).
93. Justice Blackmun, First Draft of Dissent, Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 512, Folder
10 (Nov. 22, 1988).
94. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 51 (1988).
95. Id. at 58.

2008]

OLD BLOOD, BAD BLOOD, AND YOUNGBLOOD

255

with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no
more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results
of which might have exonerated the defendant.”96
The Court was clearly troubled by the burden that a broad
constitutional rule to preserve physical evidence would impose on law
enforcement. Such a duty would result in excessive costs; the
“‘fundamental fairness’ requirement of the Due Process Clause [should
not be read] . . . as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute
duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable
evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.”97 Requiring the
defendant to show bad faith confined the State’s obligation to preserve
evidence to “reasonable bounds” and to the “class of cases where the
interests of justice most clearly required it, i.e., those cases in which the
police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a
basis for exonerating the defendant.”98 Bad faith, then, became the “brightline” test.
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s judgment, but did not join its
opinion because, in his view, it announced a proposition of law broader
than necessary to decide the case.99 Justice Stevens left open the
possibility that “there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable
to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or
destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make
a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.”100 For Justice Stevens, Youngblood
was not such a case for three reasons.
First, at the time the evidence was lost, the police had at least as great
an interest in preserving the evidence as the accused. “Even without a
prophylactic sanction such as dismissal of the indictment, the State has a
strong incentive to preserve the evidence.”101
Second, it was unlikely that Youngblood was prejudiced by the loss of
evidence. In examining witnesses and in summation, defense counsel at
trial emphasized to the jury that the State had failed to preserve evidence
that might have exonerated Youngblood.102 In addition, the trial judge
instructed the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the fact

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 60 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
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that evidence had been lost.103 “As a result, the uncertainty as to what the
evidence might have proved was turned to the defendant’s advantage.”104
Third, that no juror chose to draw the adverse inference and voted to
acquit suggested that the lost evidence was immaterial.105 “[T]he jurors in
effect indicated that, in their view, the other evidence at trial was so
overwhelming that it was highly improbable that the lost evidence was
exculpatory.”106 Had the case posed a closer question of guilt or
innocence, Justice Stevens presumed that the jurors would have been more
likely to infer that the lost evidence was exculpatory.107
In contrast to the majority, the dissent focused on materiality and
fairness to the accused, not the police officer’s state of mind. First, Justice
Blackmun rejected the bad faith standard. Under Brady and its progeny, a
due process violation could be found even in the absence of bad faith.108
Justice Blackmun also doubted that the bad faith standard created a brightline rule. Instead, the standard “may well create more questions than it
answers.”109 What was bad faith? Was it “actual malice, or would
recklessness, or the deliberate failure to establish standards for
maintaining and preserving evidence, be sufficient?”110 What was good
faith? Did it require a “certain minimum of diligence”?111
Moreover, the dissent recognized that semen samples were particularly
probative in a sexual assault case, as they could have established the
perpetrator’s blood type and whether he was a secretor or non-secretor.112
Those tests alone could have exonerated Youngblood, who was
determined to be a secretor.113 Good faith or not, that the evidence had
been destroyed was constitutionally “intolerable,” for it interfered with the
ability of the accused to present a defense.114 In lieu of the bad faith
standard, the dissent proposed the following test:
[W]here no comparable evidence is likely to be available to the
defendant, police must preserve physical evidence of a type that
they reasonably should know has the potential, if tested, to reveal

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 69.
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immutable characteristics of the criminal, and hence to exculpate a
defendant charged with the crime.115
The inquiry was essentially four-fold. First, the evidence had to be
“clearly relevant.”116 When identity was at issue, this included physical
evidence that came from the perpetrator such as blood, other bodily fluids,
fingerprints, and hair and tissue samples.117 Nevertheless, not all evidence
would have to be preserved; for example, in some cases it might be
unclear whether the material came from the perpetrator. “But in a case
where there is no doubt that the sample came from the assailant, the
presumption must be that it be preserved.”118
Next, the evidence had to “embody some immutable characteristic of
the assailant which can be determined by available testing methods.”119
This included fingerprints or biological material; blood markers could
“completely exonerate or strongly implicate a defendant.”120 The dissent
presciently noted:
As technology develops, the potential for this type of evidence to
provide conclusive results on any number of questions will increase.
Current genetic testing measures, frequently used in civil paternity
suits, are extraordinarily precise. The importance of these types of
evidence is indisputable, and requiring police to recognize their
importance is not unreasonable.121
In addition, the evidence had to be of a type “likely to be independently
exculpatory.”122 The accused should not have to prove that a particular
piece of evidence was exculpatory; this was an impossible task. How
could the accused prove something that no longer existed because of the
State’s misconduct?123 “Focusing on the type of evidence solves this

115. Id. The Blackmun Papers reveal that from the start Justice Blackmun had sought to create a
test that limited the duty to preserve evidence. Under an initial formulation, the evidence had to meet
five conditions: “1. Be clearly relev[an]t 2. Tied certainly to t[he] perpetrator 3. b[e]
ind[e]p[en]de[n]tly exculpatory 4. n[ot] b[e] cumul[ative] or collateral 5. police diffi[cultie]s in
preserving.” Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 513, Folder 1 (Sept. 25, 1988).
116. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (internal citation omitted). The dissent declined to address the issue of whether due
process requires that police testing be on the “cutting edge” of technology. Id. at 71 n.7. “But
uncertainty as to these questions only highlights the importance of preserving evidence, so that the
defense has the opportunity at least to use whatever scientifically recognized tests are available.” Id.
122. Id. at 70.
123. Id. at 71.
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problem.”124 A court could consider the type of evidence and the available
science, as well as the circumstances of the case, to determine the
likelihood that the evidence might have proved to be exculpatory.125 The
evidence could not be cumulative or collateral, and had to bear directly on
the question of innocence or guilt.126
Finally, Justice Blackmun cautioned that due process had to take into
account the cost of preserving evidence.127 Law enforcement needed to
have the option of being able to test the evidence and then to discard it.
After a suspect’s arrest, the police could notify defense counsel of plans to
dispose of the evidence. “When the defense has been informed of the
existence of the evidence, after a reasonable time the burden of
preservation may shift to the defense.”128
In applying its proposed test to the facts of the case, the dissent would
have affirmed the Arizona Court of Appeals. The evidence was obviously
material, for the semen samples on the clothing were probably larger, less
contaminated, and more likely to yield conclusive results than the samples
collected through the assault kit.129 Moreover, the semen could have
revealed an immutable characteristic of the perpetrator; thus, there was “a
genuine possibility” that the results of the testing would exonerate
Youngblood.130 The State’s case was “far from conclusive,”131 as the only
evidence implicating Youngblood was the victim’s identification of
him.132 There was no other eyewitness, and Youngblood’s car had been
destroyed before being fully examined.133 Eyewitness identification was
especially problematic in cases involving cross-racial identification and
children encouraged by adults.134

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 72.
131. Id. at 73.
132. Id. at 72.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 72 n.8. For commentary on cross-racial identification, see Radha Natarajan, Racialized
Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1821 (2003) (arguing that cross-racial eyewitness identifications are more often wrong than
same-race identifications and proposing the development of special standards to be applied to crossracial identifications). According to Natarajan, the dissent in Youngblood represents one of the few
instances in which the Court has acknowledged the difficulties of cross-racial identifications. Id. at
1823 n.14.
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Here, there was no equivalent evidence available to Youngblood.135
The assault kit’s swab contained a semen sample, but not enough to allow
for proper testing. No other evidence could have exonerated Youngblood.
Nor would preservation of the evidence have imposed a burden on the
police. Refrigeration was available, and the clothing would not have
required much storage space.136
C. Youngblood’s Significance
Youngblood’s significance is two-fold. First, as a doctrinal matter,
Youngblood represents an important limitation of the constitutional right
of access to evidence. The Supreme Court rejected a view of due process
that was more protective of the rights of the accused; instrumentalism
trumped adjudicative fairness. The Court crafted a rule that broke with
prevailing precedent in state and lower federal courts137 and that relied
upon strands of prior holdings to make the presence or absence of bad
faith the linchpin of the analysis, instead of examining materiality or
prejudice to the accused. Second, Youngblood retains its vitality on the
federal level, as the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the bad faith
standard.138
1. Competing Visions of Due Process
Youngblood explores the meaning of procedural due process in the
context of the constitutional right of access to evidence. More than a
century ago, the Supreme Court declared that due process required
fundamental fairness of the state.139 Since that time, the Court has engaged
in the process of defining the content of fundamental fairness. In general,

135. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 73.
136. Id.
137. See Dinger, supra note 4, at 342 (“The major effect of Youngblood was that it set a precedent
for federal cases involving lost or destroyed evidence, and thereby overruled the holdings of some
federal circuits which had, to that point, made determinations based upon a balancing of ‘the
magnitude of the State’s failure to perform its duty to preserve evidence against the degree of
prejudice thereby sustained by the defendant.’”); Lembke, supra note 4, at 1240–41 (“In the years
preceding Youngblood virtually no state or federal court held that subjective bad faith on the part of the
police was required to find a fundamental fairness violation of the federal or state constitutions;
instead, these courts looked to police culpability as only one factor to be considered in assessing
whether a due process violation had occurred.”).
138. See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004) (per curiam).
139. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (due process protects “those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions”).
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precedent prior to Youngblood emphasized two different, sometimes
competing visions of due process: adjudicative fairness to the accused or
an instrumental focus on deterring official misconduct.
Adjudicative fairness seeks to ensure that the accused receives
meaningful protection in court, in other words, reliable fact finding and a
fair trial.140 The core concern is the individual and the individual’s liberty
interest. Due process shields the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
state power, thereby promoting fairness and helping prevent wrongful
conviction. This concern for the individual manifests itself in an
assessment of the materiality of evidence and prejudice to the accused,
which become paramount in determining whether a due process violation
has occurred.
The other view of due process is instrumental and more limited in its
approach. The aim of due process is to impose restraints on the state. This
includes punishing the state for police and prosecutorial misconduct.
Punishment is intended to deter future misconduct and to create a
prophylactic effect.141 In measuring the misconduct, one examines the
subjective intent of the officer and whether the officer acted in good faith
or bad faith. Under this approach, the focus is on the state, not the
individual. Moreover, the focus on the state and on deterring official
misconduct invites an examination of the costs of providing additional
process.142

140. See TRIBE, supra note 13, § 10-7, at 665 (noting that due process “may require officials to
submit to judicial or quasi-judicial review of choices which disadvantage the individual”); Seth F.
Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA
Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 588 (2002) (“The protection of innocence has been the touchstone of
due process in the criminal justice system.”).
141. The same competing values may be seen in a Fourth Amendment context. See Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974) (asking
“whether the amendment should be viewed as a collection of protections of atomistic spheres of
interest of individual citizens or as a regulation of governmental conduct”); DRESSLER & MICHAELS,
supra note 8, at 54–57 (describing different purposes of the Fourth Amendment). Moreover, they may
be viewed as roughly corresponding with Professor Packer’s characterization of criminal procedure as
having two normative models: due process or crime control. PACKER, supra note 9, at 149–73. An
instrumental approach to due process can be seen as furthering the purposes of the crime control
model.
142. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), reflects instrumental values insofar as it weighs
the nature of the private interest at stake, the value of additional safeguards, and the burden of the
safeguards on the government. Id. at 335. The Supreme Court has used this cost-benefit approach in
criminal cases, though sparingly. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631–33 (2002)
(applying Mathews to find no due process violation in requiring defendant to waive right to receive
exculpatory impeachment information as part of plea agreement); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77–
83 (1985) (applying Mathews to find that due process requires the state to provide access to psychiatric
assistance when defendant seeks to raise insanity defense). But see Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
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It is instructive to examine precedent involving the constitutional right
of access to evidence from the standpoint of both adjudicative fairness and
instrumentalism. In doing so, a continuum emerges. At one end are cases
that implicate both interests: the accused suffered prejudice and the state
acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court has had little difficulty deciding
these cases. An early example was Mooney v. Holohan.143 There, the
defendant alleged that the prosecutor had knowingly used perjured
testimony and deliberately suppressed evidence impeaching the
testimony.144 The state argued for a cramped view of due process in which
“the acts or omissions of a prosecuting attorney can [never], in and by
themselves” result in a due process violation.145 Not surprisingly, perhaps,
a unanimous Court disagreed. “Such a contrivance by a state to procure
the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant [through the knowing use
of perjury] is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is
the obtaining of a like result through intimidation.”146 Seven years later,
the Court reached a similar result in Pyle v. Kansas,147 unanimously
holding that the state’s knowing use of perjured testimony and deliberate
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violated due process.148
At the other end of the continuum are cases in which neither due
process interest is implicated: where the accused suffered little or no
prejudice from the loss of evidence and there was no evidence of bad faith.
These, too, have been comparatively easy cases for the Court to decide. In
Killian v. United States,149 the defendant alleged a denial of due process
caused by the destruction of notes that documented payments made to an
informant.150 The Court remanded for a factual hearing, noting that no due
process violation would occur as long as the notes were of limited use to
the defense and the agents had acted in good faith:
If the agents’ notes of [the informant’s] oral reports of expenses
were made only for the purpose of transferring the data thereon to
the receipts to be signed by [the informant], and if, after having
served that purpose, they were destroyed by the agents in good faith

443 (1992) (refusing to apply Mathews to assess “the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are
part of the criminal process”).
143. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
144. Id. at 110.
145. Id. at 111–12.
146. Id. at 112.
147. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
148. Id. at 216.
149. 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
150. Id. at 239–41.
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and in accord with their normal practice, it would be clear that their
destruction did not constitute an impermissible destruction of
evidence nor deprive petitioner of any right.151
Another example of this line of reasoning is United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal.152 In Valenzuela-Bernal, the defendant was charged
with an immigration offense.153 Before trial, the United States deported
two undocumented individuals that Valenzuela-Bernal had transported
after the prosecutor determined that they possessed no evidence material to
the prosecution or the defense.154 A third individual was detained to testify
for the prosecution at trial. Valenzuela-Bernal alleged a due process
violation because he was unable to interview the deportees and to
determine if they could assist his defense.155 The Supreme Court rejected
the claim. The government had “good reason to deport [the
individuals].”156 Moreover, Valenzuela-Bernal had failed to establish that
the deportees possessed testimony “material and favorable to his defense,
in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses.”157
Similarly, in California v. Trombetta, the Supreme Court considered
whether due process required the State to preserve evidence after it had
been tested.158 In Trombetta, the defendant was stopped on suspicion of
drunken driving and given an Intoxilyzer test, which indicated a bloodalcohol concentration well over 0.10 percent, the legal limit at the time.159
The police did not preserve the breath sample after it had been analyzed.160
Trombetta claimed that he would have been able to impeach the test
results and that the loss of the sample violated due process.161
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, disagreed. The Court
had “never squarely addressed” the government’s duty to preserve
evidence in criminal cases.162 “Whenever potentially exculpatory evidence

151. Id. at 242. Killian was a 5–4 decision, but the dissenters objected to other parts of the
majority decision. See also United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (loss of agent’s
notes and tape recording of interviews of defendant and witness did not result in due process violation
because proceeding was not rendered fundamentally unfair).
152. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
153. Id. at 860.
154. Id. at 861.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 866.
157. Id. at 873.
158. 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984).
159. Id. at 482.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 482–83.
162. Id. at 486.
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is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import
of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.”163
Fashioning a remedy was also difficult because the court had to choose
between dismissing the case or suppressing the State’s most probative
evidence.164
The Court offered two reasons for denying the due process claim.
Citing Killian, Justice Marshall noted that the police had acted “‘in good
faith and in accord with their normal practice.’”165 The opinion focused,
however, on the breath samples’ lack of constitutional materiality.166
“Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.”167 Constitutional
materiality meant that the evidence “must both possess an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such
a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence
by other reasonably available means.”168
Trombetta failed to meet both conditions of the constitutional
materiality standard: the breath samples did not possess apparent
exculpatory value and comparable evidence was not otherwise
unobtainable. First, based on existing testing procedures, there was very
little chance that the Intoxilyzer was wrong and the sample exculpatory.169
Second, Trombetta had other ways of demonstrating his innocence. He
was free to explore whether there was faulty calibration of the machine,
extraneous interference with its measurements, or operator error.170
Somewhere in the middle of the continuum are cases in which the facts
implicate one due process interest but not the other: the state failed to
disclose material information, but there was no evidence of bad faith.
These cases have been somewhat harder for the Court to resolve. Here, the

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 488 (quoting Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961)).
See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 641 (4th ed. 2000) (“While the Trombetta Court considered the
absence of bad faith relevant, it appeared to put the most stress on the failure of the defendant to prove
the evidence destroyed had a unique exculpatory value.”).
167. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.
168. Id. at 489.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 490. Justice O’Connor separately concurred. She noted, “Rules concerning preservation
of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional law. The failure to preserve breath
samples does not render a prosecution fundamentally unfair, and thus cannot render breath-analysis
tests inadmissible as evidence against the accused.” Id. at 491 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal
citation omitted).
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seminal case is Brady v. Maryland.171 In Brady, the defendant was
convicted of murder committed during a robbery and sentenced to
death.172 At trial, he admitted participating in the robbery but claimed that
his co-defendant, Boblit, committed the homicide.173 In spite of a request
by Brady’s defense counsel to examine Boblit’s statements, the prosecutor
unwittingly failed to disclose Boblit’s admission to killing the victim.174
The Court held that this non–bad faith failure to disclose resulted in a
denial of due process. “The suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”175 The purpose of the rule was
not to punish the State for the prosecutor’s misdeeds, but rather to avoid
an unfair trial of the accused. “Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”176
Youngblood represents a collision between the two due process
interests of ensuring fairness to the accused and of deterring official
misconduct. Youngblood’s facts fall somewhere between the facts of
Trombetta and Brady. As in Trombetta and Brady, there was no evidence
of bad faith on the part of the police. Yet while the evidence in Brady was
undoubtedly exculpatory and material, the evidence in Trombetta was not.
The test results there had been inculpatory; they were well above the legal
limit, and there was little reason to doubt their accuracy.177 Youngblood
was a stronger case for the accused than Trombetta because the pertinent
evidence was untested and was not known to be inculpatory. But
Youngblood was a weaker case for the accused than Brady because the
evidence lost in Youngblood was only potentially exculpatory.
Viewed from this perspective, the majority, concurrence, and dissent in
Youngblood advance competing conceptions of due process. For the
majority, a central concern was the burden that a broad duty to preserve
evidence would impose upon the state. The state’s duty to preserve must

171. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
172. Id. at 84–85.
173. Id. at 84.
174. Id. at 88.
175. Id. at 87.
176. Id. The Court extended the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court reiterated that the prosecutor’s good faith or bad faith
in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence was irrelevant. “If the suppression of [exculpatory]
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character
of the prosecutor.” Id. at 110.
177. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 482, 489 (1984).
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be limited to “reasonable bounds,” and, as a result, bad faith became the
touchstone.178 An instrumental conception of due process thus prevailed.
The majority’s focus was on the state and on deterring police misconduct,
not on avoiding prejudice or unfairness to the accused.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens took into account both due process
interests, though ultimately fairness to the accused trumped instrumental
considerations.179 The concurrence can be viewed as instrumental in that
Justice Stevens argued that the police already had an interest in preserving
evidence, for it might inculpate the accused. “[E]ven without a
prophylactic sanction such as dismissal of the indictment, the State has a
strong incentive to preserve the evidence.”180 In his view, establishing a
broad duty to preserve evidence would impose additional costs on the
State with little, if any, added benefit.181 But Justice Stevens was also
concerned with adjudicative fairness; he considered materiality and
prejudice to the accused.182 In the end, he rejected the bad faith standard
because “there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to
prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction
of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair.”183
The dissenters signaled their view of due process: “[t]he Constitution
requires that criminal defendants be provided with a fair trial, not merely a
‘good faith’ try at a fair trial.”184 The “primary inquiry” is on the
constitutional materiality of the lost evidence, not on the officer’s
subjective state of mind.185 Yet Justice Blackmun was not heedless of the
cost of recognizing a duty to preserve evidence. Under his approach, the
evidence had to be “clearly relevant,” “embody some immutable
characteristic of the assailant,” and be “of a type likely to be independently
exculpatory.”186 He acknowledged that “[d]ue process must also take into
account the burdens that the preservation of evidence places on the
police.”187

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
Id. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
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The majority’s focus on bad faith can be critiqued on several grounds.
First, in emphasizing bad faith, the Court altogether disregarded
materiality or prejudice to the accused. In doing so, it neglected important
principles in its own precedent. As the dissent argued, “the prosecutor’s
state of mind is not determinative.”188 Materiality, not bad faith, should be
the proper focus.189 “Regardless of intent or lack thereof, police action that
results in a defendant’s receiving an unfair trial constitutes a deprivation of
due process.”190 Moreover, although the majority cited United States v.
Marion,191 United States v. Lovasco,192 and United States v. ValenzuelaBernal,193 in support of its holding, an examination of those cases shows
that they offer limited support.194 Marion and Lovasco dealt with
preindictment delay;195 Valenzuela-Bernal involved the deportation of
potential defense witnesses.196 In all three cases the Court stressed the
importance of materiality or prejudice to the accused in determining
whether a due process violation had occurred.197
Second, Youngblood is anomalous in making bad faith the touchstone
of the due process analysis.198 The Supreme Court has applied the Due

188. Id. at 64.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 62; see also Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 537 (“The majority’s bad faith test
dilutes the guarantees of due process by allowing police motive to define the substantive rights in an
individual case.”).
191. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
192. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
193. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
194. For other critiques of the majority’s reliance on those cases, see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66
n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lembke, supra note 4, at 1221 n.47.
195. Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 (38-month delay); Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 784 (18-month delay).
196. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861.
197. See id. at 873 (deportation of witnesses in and of itself does not violate due process absent
“some showing that the evidence lost would be both material and favorable to the defense”); Lovasco,
431 U.S. at 790 (“[T]he due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as
prejudice to the accused.”); Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 (“No actual prejudice to the conduct of the
defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to
gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them.”).
198. For an exhaustive examination of the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause in a
criminal context, see Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 389–99 (2001).
Professor Israel lists North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21 (1974), as part of “a small group” of cases that require a showing of “bad purpose” on the part of
the state actors in order to establish a due process violation. Israel, supra, at 397 n.547. Both cases
involve defendants who were penalized for exercising appeal rights. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713; Perry,
417 U.S. at 22–23. In Perry, however, the Court explained that Pearce’s rationale “was not grounded
upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist.” Id. at 28. Instead, the
fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally chill a defendant’s exercise of appeal rights. Id. The
Court in Perry found a due process violation even though there was no evidence that the prosecutor
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Process Clause in every phase of the criminal justice process,199 from the
investigation of crime,200 to the indictment of charges,201 discovery,202 the
conduct of trial and the burden of proof,203 sentencing,204 and appeals.205
When certain wrongs occur, the Court has found a per se denial of due
process. The accused need not show that prejudice has occurred because it
is presumed.206 In some cases, the Court has applied a totality of
circumstances approach.207 The Court has also found a due process
violation based on prejudice to the accused, regardless of the officer’s
subjective intent.208 In other cases, the Court has examined both the
officer’s subjective intent and prejudice to the accused.209 Nevertheless, in

had acted in bad faith. Id. See also Garrett, supra note 11, at 95 n.300 (noting that Youngblood “stands
alone among fair trial rights in requiring fault”).
199. See Israel, supra note 198, at 388–89.
200. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (overly suggestive identification
procedures may violate due process, for “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a
defendant’s right to due process”).
201. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 602–08 (1985) (selective prosecution results
in denial of due process when there is disparate treatment plus improper prosecutorial motivation
based on “race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363
(1978) (vindictive prosecution results in “a due process violation of the most basic sort”); Lovasco,
431 U.S. at 789–90 (1977) (due process may be violated by “oppressive delay” in bringing charges).
202. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence
a denial of due process, even though the prosecutor did not act in bad faith).
203. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process “protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (due process requires impartial
judge).
204. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (due process violated when
defendant convicted under one statute is sentenced under another without notice and a full hearing);
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (no due process violation for sentencing judge to
consider information from persons the defendant has not confronted or cross-examined).
205. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (due process guarantees effective
assistance of counsel in criminal defendant’s first appeal as of right); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,
28–29 (1974) (violation of due process for state to file more serious charges against defendant after he
invoked his statutory right to appeal).
206. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701–04 (1975) (finding due process violation in
state law that, in effect, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal case); 273 U.S. at
535 (defendant had the right to an impartial judge “[n]o matter what the evidence was against him”).
For a fuller listing of cases, see Israel, supra note 198, at 395 n.540.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (“[R]emarks must be examined
within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor’s behavior amounted to prejudicial
error.”).
208. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
209. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488–90 (1984) (in denying due process
challenge, noting that the officers had acted in good faith and that the evidence was not
constitutionally material); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961) (no due process violation
from destruction of agents’ notes if the notes were of limited helpfulness to the defense and were
destroyed “in good faith and in accord with their normal practice”).

268

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:241

focusing exclusively on bad faith, Youngblood is unique in due process
jurisprudence.
Indeed, developments in other areas of the law, including constraints
on the reach of the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule, may have shaped Youngblood’s holding.210 In a series of
cases involving claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court gave a
limited reading to the Due Process Clause.211 In Daniels v. Williams,212 an
inmate sued for damages after slipping on a pillow left on a prison
stairway.213 He argued that the State’s negligence deprived him of a liberty
interest without due process of law. The Supreme Court disagreed,
focusing on the word “deprive”: “[n]ot only does the word ‘deprive’ in the
Due Process Clause connote more than a negligent act, but we should not
‘open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative
abuse of power.’”214 Deprivation involves “deliberate decisions of
government officials.”215 Of course, Daniels was a civil case, not a
criminal one. Nor could it have served as controlling authority for
Youngblood, unless the Court overruled Brady, for there the Court found a
due process violation “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”216
It is also useful to examine Davidson v. Cannon,217 the companion case
to Daniels. In Davidson, a prisoner sued officials under § 1983 after they
negligently failed to protect him from another inmate. A divided Court
held that no due process violation had occurred. Justice Rehnquist
explained that a “lack of [due] care simply does not approach the sort of
abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed to
prevent.”218 The split in Davidson foreshadowed the split in Youngblood.
In Davidson, as in Youngblood, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall
dissented, and Justice Stevens concurred separately. For Justice Stevens, a

210. See supra notes 10–11.
211. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
212. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
213. Id. at 328.
214. Id. at 330.
215. Id. at 331; see also TRIBE, supra note 13, § 10–7, at 665 (noting that for the majority, “due
process functions only to curb governmental abuse, unfairness, or oppression, not to compensate for
injury caused by unintentional official behavior”).
216. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Of course, this raises the curious issue of
whether “deprivation” has different meanings for the Due Process Clause depending on whether the
matter is civil or criminal or nature.
217. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
218. Id. at 347–48. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice
Powell, and Justice O’Connor.
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“deprivation” had occurred.219 As in Youngblood, he reasoned that the
focus should be on the victim’s loss, not the official’s state of mind.220 The
harm to a prisoner was the same regardless of whether the official acted
negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. Davidson, however, had failed to
demonstrate that state procedures for redressing this type of injury were
constitutionally inadequate.221 In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that a
due process violation could be based on recklessness or deliberate
indifference.222 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, advocated a
more flexible standard in which even negligence might suffice.223 “In
some cases, by any reasonable standard, governmental negligence is an
abuse of power.”224
Similarly, Fourth Amendment precedent may have influenced the
Youngblood majority. There are striking parallels between Youngblood
and United States v. Leon,225 even though the two cases address different
constitutional rights and concerns.226 In Leon, for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule, the Court distinguished between good
faith and bad faith police conduct.227 Bad faith—or conduct in which the
Fourth Amendment violation was “substantial and deliberate”—resulted in
an application of the exclusionary rule.228 In contrast, good faith did not.
An officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on a defective warrant would

219. Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., concurring).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 341–42.
222. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 353.
224. Id. The denouement of Daniels and Davidson was DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In DeShaney, the Court articulated a conception of due process as a
negative liberty: “The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. . . . Like its counterpart in the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent
government ‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.’” Id. at 195–96.
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 2 (2007)
(noting that in DeShaney “Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the Constitution typically provides
negative liberties and does not impose affirmative duties on the government”). For other commentary
on that conception of due process, see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 2271 (1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1990); Douglas W. Kmiec, Young
Mr. Rehnquist’s Theory of Moral Rights—Mostly Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827 (2006); Laurence
H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).
225. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
226. See Lembke, supra note 4, at 1231 (“While the two cases certainly involve different
circumstances, the pragmatic reality is that the defendant will not obtain relief in either context unless
a court is convinced that the police have acted culpably.”) .
227. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 8, at 394.
228. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909.
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not lead to suppression of the evidence.229 In Leon, good faith prevented
the suppression of evidence; in Youngblood, the absence of bad faith
precluded a due process violation and dismissal of the indictment. In each
case, the officer’s subjective state of mind was outcome determinative. In
each case, the Court was troubled by the costs of finding a violation.230
And, in each case, the Court viewed the constitutional provision at issue in
an instrumental fashion, as intended to deter police misconduct.231 The
cost of imposing a sanction was deemed to outweigh any putative benefits.
Third, Youngblood simply ignored established precedent from state and
lower federal courts that used a multi-factor balancing test to take into
account prejudice to the defendant and the nature of the government’s
conduct.232 Two sources of law appear to have been particularly influential
in the development of a balancing test. One was the common law doctrine
of spoliation of evidence. Since the early seventeenth century, the common
law had recognized spoliation in a civil context, omnia praesumuntur

229. Id. at 922.
230. See id. (“We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant
cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
(Due Process Clause should not be read “as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute
duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a
particular prosecution”).
231. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (“The [exclusionary] rule . . . operates as ‘a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’”); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58
(“[R[equiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the
police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases
where the interests of justice most clearly require it . . . .”).
232. Dinger, supra note 4, at 342; Lembke, supra note 4, at 1240–41. For a sampling of circuit
precedent that employed a multi-factored test that took into account prejudice to the accused and the
nature of the government’s conduct, see United States v. Nabors, 707 F.2d 1294, 1296–97 (11th Cir.
1983); United States v. Gonzalez, 697 F.2d 155, 156 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Grammatikos,
633 F.2d 1013, 1019–20 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Wilks, 629 F.2d 669, 674 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the result and writing majority opinion on issue), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 227 (1st Cir.
1978); United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976). For examples of state court
precedent that discuss a balancing approach, see cases cited infra note 382; Kelley v. State, 486 So.2d
578, 581 (Fla. 1986); State v. Antwine, 636 P.2d 208, 212 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Schmid, 487
N.W.2d 539, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Haupt, 524 N.E.2d 129, 130 (N.Y. 1988); State v.
Wittenbarger, 880 P.2d 517, 523 (Wash. 1994); State v. Bauer, 368 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Wisc. Ct. App.
1985), vacated, 377 N.W.2d 175 (Wisc. 1985). For examples of other state approaches, see State v.
Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Ariz. 1993) (bad faith or prejudice to the accused); State v.
Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1992) (requirements to show due process violation are “1. a
proper defense request for the evidence, 2. a showing that the evidence would be favorable to the
defendant, and 3. a showing the evidence was material”); Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569,
571 (Ky. 1997) (evidence must be either intentionally destroyed or destroyed inadvertently outside
normal practice and possess apparent exculpatory value).
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contra spoliatorem (all things are presumed against a wrongdoer).233 The
destruction of evidence had to be intentional or in bad faith.234 The remedy
was often a jury instruction in which the finder of fact could draw an
adverse inference from the destruction.235 Early American treatises on
evidence establish that, at some point, the civil law of spoliation crossed
into the criminal realm, and the general duty to preserve evidence applied
to the defense and prosecution alike.236 Courts similarly recognized that
the duty applied to all parties in a criminal case.237 Indeed, a prosecutor’s
questionable failure to produce material evidence could result in the
imposition of sanctions, including the suppression of evidence238 and
reversal of a conviction.239 Conversely, the loss of evidence did not result

233. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 6.8 (2d ed. 1995); Lawrence
Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36
EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087 (1987) (“Since the early seventeenth century, the legal maxim omnia
praesumuntur contra spoliatorem (all things are presumed against a wrongdoer) has expressed a rule
that allows the fact finder to draw an unfavorable inference against a litigant who has destroyed
documents relevant to a legal dispute.”).
234. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 233, § 2.8.
235. Id. § 2.1.
236. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 42 (1842) (“The
presumption of innocence may be overthrown, and a presumption of guilt be raised, by the misconduct
of the party in suppressing or destroying evidence, which he ought to produce, or to which the other
party is entitled.”); 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES
602 (8th ed. 1880) (“‘The suppression or destruction of pertinent evidence . . . is always a prejudicial
circumstance of great weight; for as no act of a rational being is performed without a motive, it
naturally leads to the inference that such evidence, if it were adduced, would operate unfavorably to
the party in whose power it is.’”); 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 278 (1904) (“It has always been understood—the inference,
indeed, is one of the simplest in human experience—that a party’s falsehood or other fraud in the
preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or
spoliation, and all similar conduct, is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that
his case is a weak or unfounded one, and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the
cause’s lack of truth and merit.”); 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE 966–67 (Edgar W. Camp ed.,
1907) (“The rule as to spoliation applies equally in a criminal case except as to the failure or refusal of
the defendant to testify in his own behalf.”).
237. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621 (1896) (“The destruction, suppression or
fabrication of evidence undoubtedly gives rise to a presumption of guilt to be dealt with by the jury.”);
United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951) (“Evidence of efforts to suppress
testimony or evidence in any form like the spoliation of documents is affirmative evidence of the
weakness of the prosecution’s case.”); United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436, 443 (2d Cir. 1939)
(“The principle [of spoliation] is equally applicable to the prosecution of a criminal charge.”); State v.
Chamberlain, 1 S.W. 145, 147 (Mo. 1886) (“Every presumption is against the destroyer of evidence.”).
238. See Hagan v. United States, 5 F.2d 965, 965 (8th Cir. 1925) (failure to produce search
warrant coupled with “strangely vague” testimony regarding its terms led court to conclude that “the
warrant was insufficient and that the seizure thereunder was illegal”).
239. See Hiner v. State, 149 N.E. 168, 169 (Ind. 1925) (“It was incumbent upon . . . [the state] to
produce evidence that would naturally have been produced in an honest effort to support the charge in
the indictment, and its nonproduction permits the inference that if such evidence had been given, its
tenor would have been unfavorable to [the state].”); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 182, 184
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in sanctions when the evidence was not material and the prosecutor had
acted in good faith.240
In addition to the doctrine of spoliation, another more recent,
influential source of law in the development of a pre-Youngblood
balancing test was Supreme Court precedent that recognized and
developed the constitutional right of access to evidence under the Due
Process Clause.241 As we have seen, that precedent examined materiality
or prejudice to the accused and often the state actor’s subjective intent as
well.
United States v. Loud Hawk242 is a noteworthy example of a preYoungblood lower federal court articulating a multi-factor test that takes
into account prejudice to the defendant and the nature of the government’s
conduct.243 Such a test synthesizes both conceptions of due process:
adjudicative fairness and instrumentalism. In Loud Hawk, an en banc
decision of the Ninth Circuit, then-Judge Kennedy described a test
grounded not in the Due Process Clause itself but in the supervisory power
of the court “to prevent police misconduct and permit as fair a trial as
possible.”244 In cases involving the destruction of evidence, “[t]he proper
balance is that between the quality of the Government’s conduct and the
degree of prejudice to the accused.”245 Loud Hawk established a balancing
test in which the two key variables were government fault and prejudice to
the accused:
In a rare case, government action may be so culpable that deterrence
of future violations and protection of judicial integrity become the

(Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (“The concealment and suppression of the written statement raise the inference
that it contained something favorable to the accused.”); White v. State, 248 S.W. 690, 692 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1923) (“In a case of circumstantial evidence, inferences from evidence not introduced which are
in the possession of the state are in favor of and not against the accused.”).
240. See United States v. David, 246 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1957) (no adverse inference from
destruction of evidence where defendant conceded presence of alcohol and where destruction of jugs
and shopping bags followed customary practice); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637 (2d Cir.
1950) (Hand, J.) (spoliation inference unwarranted where government destroyed wiretap records but
summaries of originals remained, the records were of limited relevance, the destruction followed
“usual practice,” and there was “scarcely . . . a sinister purpose”); McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d
128, 137 (8th Cir. 1937) (destruction of marked ransom money in kidnapping case by Treasury
officials, not prosecutor, was “improvident and ill-considered” but did not preclude use of secondary
evidence to establish recovery of money).
241. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Pyle
v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
242. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
243. Id. at 1151–52.
244. Id. at 1153–54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the result and writing majority opinion on issue).
245. Id. at 1152.
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principal concern, and then only a plausible suggestion of prejudice
or none at all would be required for suppression of evidence or the
imposition of other sanctions, such as dismissal of charges. In the
more frequent case, the Government’s responsibility for loss of the
evidence is caused by actions that are, alternatively, negligent in
some degree, or inadvertent, or done intentionally but with an
element of good faith, and in these instances a somewhat greater
degree of prejudice may be tolerated. In cases of severe prejudice,
suppression or other sanctions would be appropriate without regard
to the good faith or culpability of the Government. However, in
other cases, proper reconciliation of these competing interests
requires us to resort to the familiar judicial process of balancing the
factors in a given case.246
In Youngblood, the Supreme Court attempted to draw a bright-line that
determined when the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence resulted in a
due process violation. Bad faith became the key. But in emphasizing bad
faith at the expense of materiality or fairness to the accused, the Court
ignored the balancing approach in effect in state and lower federal
courts.247 More than that, the Court disregarded important principles from
its own precedent.248 In Brady, the non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence
violated due process even though the prosecutor had not acted in bad faith
at all.249 In other cases involving the loss of evidence, the Court had taken
into account both materiality and the nature of the government’s

246. Id.
247. Lembke, supra note 4, at 1240–41 (“In the years preceding Youngblood virtually no state or
federal court held that subjective bad faith on the part of the police was required to find a fundamental
fairness violation of the federal or state constitutions; instead, these courts looked to police culpability
as only one factor to be considered in assessing whether a due process violation had occurred.”);
Dinger, supra note 4, at 382 (“The majority opinion in Youngblood v. Arizona created a rule with no
basis in historical or legal precedent.”).
248. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 n.* (2004) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Youngblood’s focus on the subjective motivation of the police represents a break with our usual
understanding that the presence or absence of constitutional error in suppression of evidence cases
depends on the character of the evidence, not the character of the person who withholds it.”); 2
JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.04, at 151 (4th
ed. 2006) (“This result stands in direct contrast to the Court’s treatment of exculpatory material in the
possession of the police, for which good or bad faith is irrelevant when the prosecution fails to disclose
it.”); WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 166, at 641 (“While the Trombetta Court considered the
absence of bad faith relevant, it appeared to put the most stress on the failure of the defendant to prove
the evidence destroyed had a unique exculpatory value.”); Lembke, supra note 4, at 1221 (describing
Youngblood as “a clear retreat from Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Agurs, which held police
bad faith to be irrelevant to a due process analysis”).
249. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
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conduct.250 Under Youngblood, with respect to potentially exculpatory
evidence, the Court would do so no more. An instrumental conception of
due process trumped an alternative conception that insisted on adjudicative
fairness.
2. Youngblood’s Vitality
Not only has Youngblood been an influential case, but the Supreme
Court has re-affirmed its holding. In Illinois v. Fisher,251 the defendant
was arrested for possession of cocaine.252 Fisher filed a discovery motion
and requested that the State’s physical evidence be made available to
him.253 He then absconded and was caught more than ten years later. By
then, the cocaine had been destroyed pursuant to police procedure. Fisher
filed a motion to dismiss based on the State’s destruction of evidence.254
The motion was denied, and he was convicted at trial. The Illinois Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that due process required dismissal of the
charges because the police, despite acting in good faith and according to
established procedures, had destroyed evidence subject to the defendant’s
discovery request.255
The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Court of Appeals. The
existence of a pending discovery request did not eliminate the need to
show bad faith on the part of the police. The point of the bad faith
requirement was “to ‘limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to
preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of
cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.’”256 Youngblood
applied even if the contested evidence provided a defendant’s only hope
for exoneration and was outcome determinative. The Court explained:
[T]he applicability of the bad-faith requirement in Youngblood
depended not on the centrality of the contested evidence to the
prosecution’s case or the defendant’s defense, but on the distinction
between “material exculpatory” evidence and “potentially useful”
evidence. As we have held, the substance destroyed here was, at

250. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858 (1982); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
251. 540 U.S. 544 (2004) (per curiam).
252. Id. at 545.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 546.
255. Id. at 546–47.
256. Id. at 548 (alterations in original) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).
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best, “potentially useful” evidence, and therefore Youngblood’s badfaith requirement applies.257
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.258 He reiterated that “‘there
may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State
acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is
nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair.’”259 He also noted that a number of states have
rejected the Youngblood bad faith standard under state constitutional
law.260 Here, however, the loss of evidence was not so critical to the
defense as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.261 Indeed, Justice
Stevens criticized the Court for granting certiorari.262
D. A Postscript: The Rest of the Story
No examination of Youngblood would be complete without discussing
what happened after the Supreme Court’s reversal. On remand, an
insistent Arizona Court of Appeals found a violation of state due process,
which “provide[s] greater protection than its federal counterpart.”263 The
semen evidence was “‘virtually dispositive of guilt or innocence, and
collecting the evidence places only a slight burden upon the state.’”264 The
court concurred with Justice Blackmun “that this type of evidence, which
a reasonable police officer should know ‘has the potential, if tested, to
reveal immutable characteristics of the criminal, and hence to exculpate a
defendant charged with the crime,’ . . . was not only relevant . . . but in
this case there was no comparable evidence available to Youngblood.”265
A divided Arizona Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.266 The
state supreme court held that a proper application of the state constitution
led to the same result that the Supreme Court had reached under the U.S.
Constitution: the failure to preserve potentially exculpatory physical
evidence did not violate due process absent bad faith on the part of the

257. Id. at 549 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57–58) (citations omitted).
258. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
259. Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61).
260. Id. at 549 n.*.
261. Id. at 549.
262. Id. at 550.
263. State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759, 762 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d, 844 P.2d 1152 (Ariz.
1993).
264. Id. at 763 (quoting Montano v. Superior Court, 719 P.2d 271, 275 (Ariz. 1986)).
265. Id. at 764 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 69 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
266. State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Ariz. 1993).
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state.267 “Where the nature of the evidence—exculpatory, inculpatory, or
neutral—is unknown, as in these cases, there can be no showing of
prejudice in fact. Thus, only a showing of bad faith implicates due
process.”268
The Arizona Supreme Court noted that under State v. Willits,269 when
the State “lost, destroyed, or failed to preserve” potentially exculpatory
evidence, the trial court should instruct the jury to draw an adverse
inference against the State if the jury found the State’s explanation for the
loss inadequate.270 Such an instruction had been given in Youngblood’s
case. “With respect to evidence which might be exculpatory, and where
there is no bad faith conduct, the Willits rule more than adequately
complies with the fundamental fairness component of Arizona due
process.”271 Youngblood’s conviction was thus reinstated.272
Youngblood, who had served three years in prison before being
released by the first Arizona Court of Appeals decision and who had
remained free as his case wound its way through the courts, was returned
to prison for a second time in 1993.273 Five years later, in 1998, he was
released on parole. In 1999, he was charged with failing to register his new
address as required by Arizona’s sex offender laws.274
All along, Youngblood’s trial counsel, Carol Wittels, believed in his
innocence. In 1999, as a birthday present, she asked her husband, Scott
McNamara, who was also an attorney, to represent Youngblood.275 At
McNamara’s request, the police tested the rectal swab using new,
sophisticated forensic DNA typing. The results exonerated Youngblood;
he was released from prison and his conviction vacated.276 David L.’s

267. Id.
268. Id. at 1157.
269. 393 P.2d 274 (Ariz. 1964).
270. Youngblood, 844 P.2d at 1156.
271. Id. at 1156–57.
272. Id. at 1158.
273. See Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Larry Youngblood, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/303.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Innocence Project, Know the
Cases].
274. Id.
275. Telephone Interview with Carol Wittels, supra note 62. For an interview of Larry
Youngblood and Carol Wittels, see Religion & Ethics Newsweekly: DNA and Fair Trials (PBS
television broadcast June 9, 2006), available at http://pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week941/
feature.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
276. Innocence Project, Know the Cases, supra note 273. See also Machelor, supra note 42;
Whitaker, supra note 6. Justice Blackmun’s Papers include an August 2000 newspaper article
reporting Youngblood’s exoneration, Laurie P. Cohen, DNA Tests Free Man Imprisoned 10 Years:
Supreme Court Had Ruled Destruction of Evidence Didn’t Prevent Fair Trial, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2000, at B12, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 20, Box 512, Folder 10, but the Justice had died a year
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identification had been proven wrong to a scientific certainty. The Pima
County Attorney apologized to Youngblood and vowed to test DNA in
cases in which there was even “an inkling” that a conviction was
mistaken.277
The DNA profile from the evidence was entered into a national
database for convicted offenders, and in early 2001 the police determined
that the profile matched that of Walter Calvin Cruise, who was serving a
prison sentence in Texas on unrelated charges.278 Cruise had two prior
child sex abuse convictions in Texas.279 Both cases preceded his assault of
David L.280 Cruise was African-American and was blind in his left eye,
which was also misshapen.281 After being charged in Pima County, Cruise
pled guilty to sexual conduct with a minor and was sentenced to twentyfour years of imprisonment.282 One of the victim’s three sisters spoke at
the sentencing hearing: “I spent most of my life and wasted most of my
life hating Larry Youngblood.”283 Youngblood’s lawyer invited him to
Cruise’s sentencing, but he was too angry to attend.284
There were other tragic twists to this case. After the assault, David L.
had a troubled youth characterized by problems with the law and
substance abuse.285 According to his mother, she saw a “tremendous
change” in him; he went from being “very sweet” to being aggressive and
angry.286 In 1993, David L. was sent to prison for assaulting a girlfriend
and attempting to flee the police.287 In June 1999, he assaulted a former
girlfriend.288 A few weeks before Youngblood was freed, David L. was
sentenced to one-and-a-half years in prison. The judge who sentenced him

earlier in 1999. Library of Congress, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun (1908–1999): A
Selected Bibliography, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/blackmun/blackmun-ex-bib.html (last
visited Nov. 24, 2008).
277. David J. Cieslak, County Moves to Find Other Cases DNA May Resolve, TUCSON CITIZEN,
Aug. 9, 2000, at 1A.
278. See Innocence Project, Know the Cases, supra note 273.
279. Teibel, supra note 7.
280. Harris County District Clerk, Certificate of Disposition of Walter Calvin Cruise (Sept. 9,
2007) (on file with author). Cruise was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child on July 2,
1982, and convicted on May 30, 1984. Id. Thus, he assaulted David L. while his Texas case was
pending.
281. Id.; Teibel, supra note 7; Innocence Project, Know the Cases, supra note 273.
282. Teibel, supra note 7.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Kimble, supra note 62.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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later exonerated Youngblood.289 In June 2004 an intoxicated David L. was
struck by a train in Tucson and killed.290
Youngblood also continued to have troubles. On April 7, 2003, he was
arrested for assaulting an employee at a Tucson eatery.291 While looking
for Youngblood, the police mistakenly stopped Professor Julian Kunnie,
Director of the University of Arizona’s Africana Studies Program.292
Kunnie, an African-American, had been attending a peace vigil at the
Islamic Center of Tucson. He was ordered to get on his knees at gunpoint,
handcuffed, and detained for about ten minutes.293 Youngblood and
Kunnie were around the same height but Youngblood was about 50
pounds heavier. Kunnie also had different hair and wore glasses.294 As for
Youngblood, he never received a penny in compensation for his wrongful
conviction and died of a drug overdose in July 2007.295
II. A CRITICAL RE-EXAMINATION OF YOUNGBLOOD
Two decades after Youngblood was decided, it is time for a critical reexamination of its holding. There are reasons to question its validity. First,
DNA testing was nascent in 1988. Since then, there have been remarkable
advances in forensic science. Evidence that might have produced an
ambiguous result in the 1980s can now be subjected to far more precise
and sensitive testing that has the potential to inculpate or exculpate to a
scientific certainty. Second, almost all states and the federal government
have enacted innocence protection acts that provide convicted individuals
with access to DNA testing.296 Many of these laws require the preservation
of DNA evidence.297 Third, a number of state courts have rejected
Youngblood’s bad faith standard in interpreting due process under their

289. Id.
290. David L. Autopsy Report, ML 04-0977, at 8 (Pima County, Arizona, June 17, 2004) (on file
with author); E-mail from Kathleen Mayer, Special Assistant to the County Attorney, Pima County
Attorney’s Office, to Norman C. Bay, Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School
of Law (Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Carol Wittels, supra note 62;
Tucson Man, 31, Dies after Being Hit by a Train, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 17, 2004, at B2.
291. L. Anne Newell, UA Prof: Campus Cops Racist, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Apr. 16, 2003, at B1.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Larry Youngblood Autopsy Report, ML 07-1362, at 2 (Pima County, Arizona, July 24, 2007)
(on file with author); E-mail from Carol Wittels to Norman C. Bay, Associate Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico School of Law (Jan. 8, 2008) (on file with author).
296. See supra note 15.
297. See supra note 16.
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constitutions.298 Finally, Youngblood draws a line that may be more blurry
than it is bright. Significant disparities characterize the way in which
courts have interpreted Youngblood, and this has led to incoherence in the
law. The one constant, however, has been that bad faith is almost
impossible to prove. In combination, those developments undermine
Youngblood’s bad faith standard as well as its conception of due process.
A. New Science
In 1983, when the crime at issue in Youngblood occurred, forensic
DNA typing did not exist. Five years later, when the Supreme Court
decided the case, DNA testing was still a recent phenomenon. There is a
world of difference between the forensic science available then and what
is available now. Developments in DNA typing over the past two decades
have been nothing short of extraordinary. Indeed, they have been so
extraordinary that they raise the question of whether the Supreme Court
would have decided the case differently if today’s science had been
available then.
In contrast to more recent forms of DNA analysis, the types of testing
at issue in Youngblood were relatively primitive, imprecise, and
insensitive. The police criminologist examined the rectal swab but was
unable to detect any blood group substances.299 By the time the
criminologist tested the victim’s clothing, fourteen months had elapsed
and the clothing had not been refrigerated or frozen.300 The ABO
technique failed to obtain blood group substances from semen stains on
the boy’s clothing. P-30 protein molecule testing of the stains identified a
small amount of semen but was inconclusive as to the assailant’s
identity.301
Even under the best of circumstances, the forensic analysis available in
1983 provided limited information. One test could determine whether the
perpetrator was a secretor or a non-secretor of genetic markers in certain
bodily fluids, such as semen and saliva.302 In 1926, scientists discovered
that blood-type substances were present in bodily fluids other than
blood.303 In general, between 75 percent and 80 percent of the population

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supra note 17.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 54 (1988).
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 54.
See State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51.
R.E. GAENSSLEN, SOURCEBOOK IN FORENSIC SEROLOGY, IMMUNOLOGY,
BIOCHEMISTRY 169, 280 (1983).

AND

280

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:241

are secretors.304 This test has the potential to exculpate (or partially
inculpate) the accused depending upon whether or not the sample matches
the suspect’s status as a secretor or non-secretor.
Another test involved blood typing or the ABO technique.305 By 1930,
blood type differences were used forensically.306 All humans have O, A, B,
or AB type blood.307 Some blood groups are common; others are
uncommon. In general, approximately 40 percent of the population is type
A, 14 percent type B, 3 percent type AB, and 43 percent type O.308 The
ABO technique compares the blood type of the accused with that of the
perpetrator.309
A non-match exculpates the accused. Conversely, a match may be
somewhat inculpatory. The usefulness of any match depends upon the
frequency of the blood type.310 Overall, blood typing is not a particularly
discriminating forensic test. The FBI has estimated that DNA testing
excluded approximately 33 percent of suspects who matched evidence
samples based on conventional serology.311
Both blood typing and testing for secretor or non-secretor status have
another serious drawback: by today’s standards they are not sensitive tests.
Under the techniques then available, a relatively large amount of genetic
material was required, and the material had to be properly preserved.312 In
several important respects, the facts of Youngblood expose the limitations
of testing for blood type and secretion. First, the trial court denied the
State’s motion for a blood and saliva sample from Youngblood on the
ground that the semen sample was too small to make a valid
comparison.313 Second, Youngblood was later found to be a secretor with
blood type A.314 But tests of the rectal swab and semen-stained clothing

304. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 17-8, at 810 (3d
ed. 1999).
305. GAENSSLEN, supra note 303, at 261.
306. Id. at 262.
307. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 304, § 17-9, at 839; NATIONAL COMM’N ON THE
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 13 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NIJ REPORT], available
at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf.
308. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 304, § 17-9(A), at 839.
309. Id. at 810–11.
310. 2000 NIJ REPORT, supra note 307, at 13–14.
311. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 88 (1992)
[hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY].
312. 2000 NIJ REPORT, supra note 307, at 15 (listing numerous advantages of DNA testing over
conventional serology).
313. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 53–54 (1988).
314. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51.
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were unable to detect any blood group substances. Either the perpetrator
was a non-secretor, or he was a secretor and the sample was insufficient to
determine blood type.315 The semen stains had deteriorated because of
improper storage; this precluded further forensic analysis.316
Unlike the majority in Youngblood, Justice Blackmun specifically
recognized the possibility of advances in forensic science.317 This weighed
in favor of recognizing a due process right to the preservation of evidence:
“As technology develops, the potential for this type of evidence to provide
conclusive results on any number of questions will increase. . . . The
importance of . . . [genetic testing measures] is indisputable, and requiring
police to recognize their importance is not unreasonable.”318
Forensic DNA typing was not developed until 1985, when Dr. Alec
Jeffreys, an English scientist, used the technique to exonerate one suspect
in the sexual assault and murder of two young girls and to inculpate
another.319 Three years later, in 1988, the same year Youngblood was
decided, the FBI began testing DNA.320 That same year, for the first
time,321 a state appellate court upheld the admission of DNA evidence in a
criminal case.322 The crime at issue in Youngblood occurred well before
the advent of DNA testing, and the Supreme Court decided the case when
DNA testing was in its infancy, still embroiled in litigation over its
reliability and admissibility.323
In the two decades since it was first used, forensic DNA typing has
continued to progress. At this point, scientists have developed three
generations of tests.324 The current, dominant generation of technology is
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR).325 This approach analyzes DNA
taken from the nucleus of a cell.326 PCR allows the DNA in a biological
sample to be replicated; only a minute amount of DNA is needed and the

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 70–71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 70.
319. 2000 NIJ REPORT, supra note 307, at 14–15; JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING 3
(2005).
320. 2000 NIJ REPORT, supra note 307, at 15.
321. TERRENCE F. KIELY, FORENSIC SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 427 (2d ed.
2006).
322. Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841, 841 (Fla. App. 1988).
323. See generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 304, at 48–49 (noting that most early
courts were “quite receptive to DNA evidence,” but that there were “occasional setbacks”).
324. Id. at 3.
325. Id. at 10, 16.
326. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 6 (2002) [hereinafter
USING DNA].
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sample from which it comes can be highly degraded.327 Only a few cells
are required for reliable results.328 Usable DNA can be recovered from a
myriad of items, including computer keyboards, hats, bandannas,
eyeglasses, facial tissue, cotton swabs, dirty laundry, toothpicks, chewing
gum, cigarette butts, envelope seals, the mouths of bottles, the rims of
glasses, or urine stains.329
PCR is usually followed by short tandem repeat (STR) testing, which
compares thirteen specific regions, or loci, found on nuclear DNA.330 The
odds that two unrelated individuals will share the same thirteen-loci DNA
profile can be as high as one in a billion or more.331 Thus, PCR-STR
analysis is both highly sensitive and discriminating. It is sensitive in that
small amounts of biological material can be tested. It is discriminating in
that the results of a thirteen-loci comparison generate unique DNA profiles
that can establish guilt or innocence to a practical certainty in certain types
of cases.332
Yet another powerful forensic DNA tool has emerged: mitochondrial
DNA (mtDNA) testing. Unlike STR analysis, this technique examines the
DNA contained in the mitochondria of a cell, not its nucleus.333 This is
important because some biological material, including hair shafts, bones,
and teeth, lack nuclei, but possess mitochondria.334 In some cases,
especially those involving decomposed tissue, only teeth or bones may
remain. Mitochondrial DNA testing allows for the study and comparison
of DNA in such material.335 One drawback to mtDNA is that it is not as
discriminating as STR.336 Mitochondrial DNA is passed maternally;
consequently, siblings and maternal relatives have the same mtDNA, and
the test cannot distinguish among them.337 Nonetheless, mtDNA provides

327. Id.; see also AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., FORENSIC DNA FUNDAMENTALS
FOR THE PROSECUTOR: BE NOT AFRAID 7–8 (2003).
328. NATIONAL COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS, at xv (1999).
329. See USING DNA, supra note 326, at 21 exhibit 4; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SERVICES 41–43 (Kim Waggoner ed., 2003), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/handbook/forensics.pdf; Ana Costello, Mercedes Alvarrez & Fernando
Verdu, DNA from a Computer Keyboard, FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMS., July 2004, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2004/case/2004_03_case01.htm.
330. USING DNA, supra note 326, at 6.
331. Id.
332. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of
rehearing en banc).
333. USING DNA, supra note 326, at 6.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 6–7.
336. 2000 NIJ REPORT, supra note 307, at 18.
337. BUTLER, supra note 319, at 248–49.
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a powerful supplement to STR and may allow for analysis when none is
otherwise available. Among other things, mtDNA has identified one of the
unknown soldiers in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington
National Cemetery, the remains of Czar Nicholas II and his family, and
the likely offspring of Thomas Jefferson and Sally Heming.338
Since 1985, the field of forensic DNA typing has continued to
progress.339 Emerging Y-chromosome analysis focuses on variations in
male genetic material; it may prove to be helpful in sexual assault cases
involving multiple male perpetrators.340 Hand-held or portable devices
with “labs-on-a-chip” may be developed that allow for rapid DNA testing
at a crime scene.341 Robotic systems are already being used to help process
DNA samples.342 Similarly, computer software compares and interprets
STR data.343 In short, forensic DNA typing will continue to become
increasingly automated, faster, cheaper, and more accurate.344 This, in
turn, ought to affect the due process calculus when the state loses or
destroys potentially exculpatory evidence. The context in which such
problems arise today is entirely different than when Youngblood was
decided.
B. Legislative Reform
As forensic DNA typing has progressed, a growing number of
individuals have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing.
According to the Innocence Project, such testing has freed more than 200
individuals, all of whom had been convicted of serious crimes.345 In
response to scientific advances, reported exonerations, and a fundamental
recognition of the power of DNA testing, almost all states and the federal
government have passed innocence protection acts. New York passed the

338. Id. at 250–53; Neil A. Lewis, Study Finds Strong Evidence Jefferson Fathered Slave Son,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at A14.
339. See BUTLER, supra note 319, at 10–13.
340. Id. at 201–03; 2000 NIJ REPORT, supra note 307, at 19; USING DNA, supra note 326, at 7.
341. BUTLER, supra note 319, at 414.
342. See id. at 422.
343. Id. at 424–29.
344. Id. at 430; see also Automating the Forensic Analysis of Nuclear DNA: The FBI’s Research
and Development Initiative, FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMS., Oct. 2004, available at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2004/research/2004_10_research04.htm (noting that commercial testing costs as
little as $1095); E-mail from Joan Gulliksen, Customer Liaison, Forensics, Orchid Cellmark, to
Norman C. Bay, Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law (Sept. 18,
2008) (on file with author) (STR analysis priced at $1095; mtDNA at $2850).
345. Innocence Project Case Profiles, supra note 3.
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first law in 1994; Illinois followed in 1997.346 Forty-three states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government now have laws that
allow for post-conviction DNA testing under certain circumstances.347
In and of themselves, innocence protection acts undermine
Youngblood’s rationale. They acknowledge the development of forensic
science in a way that the Court in Youngblood could not. More important,
as the phrase “innocence protection” suggests, their overriding concern is
fairness to the accused—the protection of innocence, not the punishment
of official misconduct.348 They evince a lingering concern that even
though a jury found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the possibility
remains that the accused has been wrongfully convicted. Moreover, as a
matter of logic, the creation of a specific statutory post-conviction right to
DNA testing is inconsistent with Youngblood’s de minimis pre-conviction
protection of potentially exculpatory evidence.349 Any right afforded by
innocence protection acts is undercut if the evidence no longer exists. Put
another way, implicit in the right to post-conviction testing is a correlative
duty on the state to preserve evidence. Otherwise, without preservation,
the statutory right is an illusory one.
Perhaps for that reason, seventeen states with innocence protection
acts, along with the District of Columbia and the federal government,
impose a “blanket” duty to preserve evidence.350 Under several statutes,
the duty begins before trial.351 Under other statutes, the duty follows
conviction, and the government must preserve all biological evidence until

346. See Diana L. Kanon, Note, Will the Truth Set Them Free? No, But the Lab Might: Statutory
Responses to Advancements in DNA Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 470–71, 480–81 (2002).
347. See supra note 15. There are significant variations among the state statutes. Some only apply
to certain types of serious offenses. Under other statutes, evidence must be preserved for as long as the
defendant remains incarcerated, for a set period of time after conviction, or during the pendency of
post-conviction proceedings. See Jones, supra note 15, at 1251; Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe
Everything You Read: A Review of Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 355, 358–60 (2002).
348. See Patrick Leahy, The Innocence Protection Act of 2001, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1115
(2001) (describing the purpose of the law as “to protect the innocent and to ensure that if the death
penalty is imposed, it is the result of informed and reasoned deliberation, not politics, luck, bias, or
guesswork”); Jones, supra note 15, at 1248–49 (“[L]egal reform was urgently needed to better protect
the rights of prisoners seeking post-conviction exoneration through the use of DNA testing.”).
349. Cf. Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1570 (“It is nonsensical to posit a
constitutional concern to ensure that the defense be able to test evidence in the prosecution’s
possession because it might be exculpatory, but not to evince a concern to ensure that the prosecution
preserve such evidence in the first place.”).
350. See supra note 16. Professor Jones characterizes innocence protection acts as imposing a
“blanket” duty, “qualified” duty, or no duty to preserve evidence, and this article adopts her
classification system. See Jones, supra note 15, at 1253–56.
351. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-104(a) (2005); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116–4(a) (2004); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.140(2) (West 2006).
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the defendant completes his sentence.352 Under federal law, and the law of
a number of jurisdictions, the unlawful destruction of physical evidence is
a crime.353 Fourteen states create a “qualified” duty to preserve evidence
that is generally triggered when a defendant files a post-conviction motion
for DNA testing.354 Two states impose a “blanket” duty in capital cases
and a “qualified” duty in non-capital cases.355 In nine states, the statute is
silent on the duty to preserve evidence.356 Two of those states, however,
have rejected Youngblood’s bad faith standard in interpreting due process
under their own constitutions.357 Only one state’s statute explicitly
disclaims a duty to preserve evidence.358
That so many states now require the preservation of physical evidence
is significant. The duty to preserve evidence applies even after the finder
of fact has overcome the presumption of innocence and found guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. It is equally significant that states have adopted this
measure even though the law in this area is less than clear. Some courts
have said that there is no post-conviction federal due process right to
access DNA evidence at all.359 It is also an open question whether

352. Jones, supra note 15, at 1255–56.
353. Id. at 1258.
354. Id. at 1254, 1254 n.75. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240(H) (2004); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 5-5-41(C)(10) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 884D-122 (2004); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14(1) (2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(b)(2) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120(3)–(4) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.0918(3) (2004); N.M. STAT. § 31-1A-2(L) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71–.81 (West
2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1(b)(2) (2004); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-30-309 (2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-9-301 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(6) (West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 974.07(5)
(2004).
355. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1(H)(1)–(5) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(A)
(2004).
356. Jones, supra note 15, at 1253, 1253 n.73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2005); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-4902 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 590.01–.06 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32a
(2005); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29.32.1-15
(2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.005 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5566.1; W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-14
(2005).
357. See Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va.
1995).
358. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-414(3) (2004) (noting that the statute “does not create a duty to
preserve biological evidence nor does it create a liability on the part of a law enforcement agency for
failing to preserve biological evidence.”).
359. See Alley v. Key, No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364 (6th Cir. May 16, 2006), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 2973 (2006); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 372 (4th Cir. 2002). But see Osborne v. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing “due process right to postconviction access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence”), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (Nov. 3,
2008) (No. 08-6); Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006) (not recognizing right on
facts of case but “not foreclose[ing] the possibility that a § 1983 plaintiff could, under some
extraordinary circumstances, be entitled to post-conviction access to biological evidence for the
purpose of performing DNA testing”); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 312 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244–51 (D. Mass.
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Youngblood even applies to the post-conviction destruction of evidence.
Some courts have held that it does not;360 others have reached a contrary
result.361 Regardless, imposing an affirmative statutory duty upon the state
to preserve evidence is at odds with the limited protection afforded by
Youngblood’s bad faith standard.
As a matter of either law or policy, it makes little sense to require the
preservation of potentially exculpatory DNA evidence post-conviction,
when the presumption of innocence no longer applies, but not preconviction, when the accused is presumed innocent and the evidence
might help avoid a wrongful conviction from the start. It is illogical not to
afford the same protection pre-conviction as is afforded post-conviction.
Indeed, the American Bar Association recently passed Criminal Justice
Standards on DNA Evidence that declare, “Consistent with the rights of
privacy and due process, DNA evidence should be collected, preserved,
tested, and used when it may advance the determination of guilt or

2006) (Gertner, J.) (finding due process right based on Brady and meaningful access to court);
Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767–69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). For authority recognizing the
conflict among the courts of appeals, see Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2008)
(noting conflict but declining to resolve issue).
For commentary on this issue, see Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 140, at 547 (arguing that
under the Due Process Clause there is a post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence); David
DeFoore, Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for Justice from the Wrongly Convicted, 33 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 491 (2002) (urging legislatures to pass post-conviction laws for DNA testing); Todd E.
Jaworsky, A Defendant’s Right to Exculpatory Evidence: Does the Constitutional Duty to Disclose
Evidence Extend to New Evidence Discovered Post-Conviction?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 245 (2002)
(arguing that the prosecutor should have a constitutional duty to disclose post-conviction exculpatory
evidence).
360. See Tyler v. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696, 703 (8th Cir. 2005) (Youngblood does not apply to
evidence lost or destroyed after trial); Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2005).
361. See Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying Youngblood to
post-conviction destruction of evidence and finding prima facie evidence of bad faith so as to deprive
officers of qualified immunity in § 1983 claim); Harvey, 278 F.3d at 387 (King, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (adopting Youngblood in context of state’s denial of post-conviction
access to evidence); People v. Barksdale, 762 N.E.2d 669, 683 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001) (applying
Youngblood to post-conviction destruction of evidence, for “[i]t would be illogical to relieve defendant
of the requirement to show bad faith on the part of the State or the police where the evidence was
destroyed after a fair trial, as opposed to during the trial”); Commonwealth v. Moss, 689 A.2d 259,
263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (applying Youngblood to post-conviction loss of evidence); Commonwealth
v. Robinson, 682 A.2d 831, 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (same). In a number of cases, courts have
assumed arguendo that Youngblood applies to the post-conviction destruction of evidence. See Cress v.
Palmer, 484 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that state court’s decision as to lack of bad faith not
unreasonable for purposes of habeas claim); Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 187 (4th Cir. 2005) (test not
met on facts of case); People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 331 (Ill. 1998) (finding prima facie showing
of bad faith warranting evidentiary hearing); Thompson v. State, No. E2003-01089-CCA-R3-PC, 2004
WL 911279 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2004) (defendant cannot meet standard even if it applies);
Lovitt v. Worden, 585 S.E.2d 801, 815 (Va. 2003) (same).
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innocence.”362 Similarly, a few courts have recognized a post-conviction
due process right to access DNA evidence.363 Overall, those developments
are evidence of an evolving norm that, as a matter of fundamental fairness,
overrides Youngblood even post-conviction in cases involving biological
material amenable to forensic DNA typing.
C. State Judicial Disapproval
Quite apart from breakthroughs in forensic DNA typing and in the
proliferation of innocence protection acts at the state and federal level,
there has been one other significant development in state law. In the
decade following Youngblood, ten states, either explicitly or implicitly,
spurned Youngblood’s bad faith standard in interpreting due process under
their own constitutions.364 Accordingly, a clear majority of states—thirtynine in all—plus the federal government and the District of Columbia,
now either reject the bad faith standard under their own constitutions or
have passed innocence protection acts that impose either a blanket or
qualified post-conviction duty to preserve DNA evidence.
States have rejected Youngblood as a matter of state constitutional law
for a variety of reasons. First, some states have stressed adjudicative
fairness, not instrumentalism, in interpreting due process. A central
concern is fairness to the accused: “Fairness dictates that when a person’s
liberty is at stake, the sole fact of whether the police or another state
official acted in good or bad faith in failing to preserve evidence cannot be
determinative of whether the criminal defendant has received due process

362. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON DNA EVIDENCE std. 1.2(a) (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/dnaevidence.html.
363. See supra note 359.
364. See supra note 17; Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 n.* (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that “a number of state courts have held as a matter of state constitutional law
that the loss or destruction of evidence critical to the defense does violate due process, even in the
absence of bad faith”); Dinger, supra note 4, at 348 (“[T]hirteen [states] have ruled that the defendant
need not make an absolute showing of bad faith on the part of the police in order to successfully
challenge the destruction or loss of evidence, but that a balancing test should be used to determine
whether his or her due process rights have been violated.”). Although Dinger identified thirteen states
that did not follow Youngblood, three of those states—Idaho, Minnesota, and New Mexico—appear to
have adopted a bad faith standard. See Garcia v. State Tax Comm’n, 38 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Idaho 2002)
(“[A] specific showing of bad faith is required to constitute a due process violation.”); State v.
McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373, 387 (Minn. 2001) (“[T]o determine whether [the defendant] is entitled
to relief based on the state’s failure to preserve evidence, we consider whether the destruction was
intentional and whether the exculpatory value of the lost or destroyed evidence was apparent and
material.”); State v. Stills, 957 P.2d 51, 62 (N.M. 1998) (“In the absence of evidence that the State
acted in bad faith, failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence for future testing is not grounds
for excluding relevant, probative testimony regarding that evidence.”).
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of law.”365 Several state courts have cited to Justice Stevens’s concurrence
with approval.366 The defendant should be entitled to protection greater
than that afforded by Youngblood; even if the state did not act in bad faith,
the loss of evidence could render the trial fundamentally unfair.367
Second, as a matter of policy, the bad faith rule of Youngblood may
encourage the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. “[E]vidence
destroyed becomes merely ‘potentially useful’ since its contents would be
unprovable.”368
Third, bad faith is extremely difficult to prove. “Short of an admission
by the police, it is unlikely that a defendant would ever be able to make
the necessary showing to establish the required elements for proving bad
faith.”369
Fourth, Youngblood fails to allow consideration of the lost evidence’s
materiality or its effect on the defendant’s case. Negligently lost evidence
might “critically prejudice” a defendant.370 In some jurisdictions, the
Youngblood test also puts the trial court to an “all-or-nothing” choice:
either bad faith is found and the charges dismissed, or it is not found and
the defendant is denied a favorable inference.371
In place of Youngblood’s bad faith standard, states have turned to a
multi-factor balancing test that resembles then-Judge Kennedy’s approach
in Loud Hawk.372 A typical formulation can be found in Lolly v. State.373
There, the Delaware Supreme Court applied a three-pronged balancing test
that examines the “type of evidence, the conduct of the police, and the

365. State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 593 (Conn. 1995); accord State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912,
917 (Tenn. 1999) (“[W]e deem the preservation of the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial to
be a paramount consideration here . . . .”).
366. Morales, 657 A.2d at 593; Ex Parte Gingo, 605 So.2d 1337, 1241 (Ala. 1992) (adopting
Stevens’s concurrence in Youngblood); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 n.9
(Alaska 1989) (same); State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80, 99 (Haw. 1995) (same); Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 497 (Mass. 1991) (same); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 511 (W.
Va. 1995) (same).
367. See supra note 366.
368. Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 n.9.
369. Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1992); Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 916 (“[P]roving bad
faith on the part of the police would be, in the least, extremely difficult.”).
370. State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (Utah 1994). Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 916 (“[T]he
Youngblood analysis apparently permits no consideration of the materiality of the missing evidence or
its effect on the defendant’s case.”); Lolly, 611 A.2d at 960 (“[T]he focus is on the conduct of the
police not the nature of the evidence.”).
371. Lolly, 611 A.2d at 960.
372. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the result and writing majority opinion on issue); see also Dinger, supra note 4, at 356–
61 (describing various balancing tests).
373. 611 A.2d 956.
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significance of the evidence . . . available at trial.”374 Under this “totality
of circumstances approach,” the trial court is able to engage in a nuanced
balancing process that avoids the all-or-nothing result of Youngblood and
may impose penalties short of dismissal.375
D. Doctrinal Incoherence
Now that two decades have passed since Youngblood was decided, it is
possible to review how jurisdictions around the United States have
interpreted its holding. Such a review reveals that the line it has drawn is
less than bright; in fact, as the dissent in Youngblood forewarned,376 it is
blurry. Courts have differed on significant aspects of Youngblood,
including the definition of bad faith, the availability of a missing evidence
instruction, the relationship between Trombetta and Youngblood and
whether the lost evidence must be potentially exculpatory or possess
apparent exculpatory value, and the remedy for a due process violation.
Collectively, those disparities undermine the legal framework established
by Youngblood and result in a rule of law that defies consistent application
in jurisdictions across the United States.
1. The Meaning of Bad Faith
Central to Youngblood is the meaning of bad faith. Even on such a
fundamental issue, jurisdictions have formulated an assortment of

374. Id. at 959.
375. Id. at 960. Other courts have adopted a similar multi-factor balancing test. See State v.
Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 593 (Conn. 1995) (considering “the materiality of the missing evidence, the
likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, the reason for its nonavailability to
the defense and the prejudice to the defendant caused by its unavailability”); Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 496 (Mass. 1991) (“the judge must consider and balance the degree of
culpability of the government, the materiality of the evidence, and the potential prejudice to the
defendant”); Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917 (articulating three factors, including “[t]he degree of
negligence involved,” “[t]he significance of the destroyed evidence,” and “[t]he sufficiency of the
other evidence used at trial to support the conviction”); Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642–43 (“[I]f a defendant
shows a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would be exculpatory, . . . then the proper
sanctions depend ‘upon a pragmatic balancing of three factors: (1) the degree of negligence or bad
faith on the part of the government; (2) the importance of the evidence lost; and (3) other evidence of
guilt adduced at trial.’”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va.
1995) (“[A] trial court should consider (1) the degree of negligence or bad faith involved; (2) the
importance of the missing evidence considering the probative value and reliability of secondary or
substitute evidence that remains available; and (3) the sufficiency of the other evidence produced at the
trial to sustain the conviction.”).
376. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 66 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he line
between ‘good faith’ and ‘bad faith’ is anything but bright, and the majority’s formulation may well
create more questions than it answers.”).
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definitions. The two most common definitions equate bad faith with
knowledge or wrongful intent.377 Some jurisdictions focus on the Court’s
statement that bad faith “must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge
of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or
destroyed.”378 Other jurisdictions equate bad faith with wrongful intent or
official animus.379 The federal courts of appeals are no more consistent
than the states; they offer a mix of definitions as well.380
In most instances, definitions based on knowledge or intent will reach
the same result; a case that satisfies one will often satisfy the other. This is
not necessarily so, however, and the use of the terms is imprecise, at least
from a Model Penal Code perspective.381 Knowledge applies to the
attendant circumstance (or condition) that the evidence have exculpatory

377. Id. at 56 n.*. For examples of jurisdictions that focus on knowledge, see State v. O’Dell, 46
P.3d 1074, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 205 (Cal. 1998); State v. Finley,
42 P.3d 723, 727 (Kan. 2002); State v. Heath, 685 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Smith, 157 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Castor, 599 N.W.2d 201, 214 (Neb. 1999);
State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 1105 (R.I. 2005); State v. Jackson, 396 S.E.2d 101, 102 (S.C. 1990);
State v. Morales, 844 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Park v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d
172, 179 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). For examples of jurisdictions that rely on wrongful intent, see Guzman
v. State, 868 So.2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2003) (“[B]ad faith exists only when police intentionally destroy
evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant.”); People v. Gentry, 815 N.E.2d 27, 33 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2004) (“‘official animus . . . or . . . a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence’”);
Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Ky. 1997) (“ill motive or intention”); State v.
Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886, 891 (La. 1989) (“‘official animus . . . or . . . conscious effort to suppress
exculpatory evidence’”); Murray v. State, 849 So.2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 2003) (“‘conscious doing of a
wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity’”); State v. Hunt, 483 S.E.2d 417, 421 (N.C.
1997) (“bad faith or willful intent”); State v. Durnwald, 837 N.E.2d 1234, 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
(“‘dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some
ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud’”); State v. Bousum, 663 N.W.2d 257, 263
(S.D. 2003) (“Bad faith . . . means the state deliberately destroyed the evidence with the intent to
deprive the defense of information . . . .”); State v. Greenwold, 525 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Wisc. Ct. App.
1994) (“[B]ad faith can only be shown if: (1) the officers were aware of the potentially exculpatory
value or usefulness of the evidence they failed to preserve; and (2) the officers acted with official
animus or made a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”).
378. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*; see supra note 377.
379. See supra note 377.
380. Compare United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 911 (10th Cir. 1994) (knowledge of the
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time of destruction), and In re Sealed Case, 99 F.3d 1175,
1178 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), and United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 996 (1st Cir. 1993), with United
States v. Estrada, 453 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2006) (“malicious intent”), and United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 2000) (knowledge and “official animus” or a
“conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence”), and United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218
(6th Cir. 1996) (equating “official animus” or “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence”
with police’s knowledge of the evidence’s exculpatory value at the time it was lost or destroyed).
381. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(a)(i), (b)(i) (1962) (defining “purposely” with respect to
“conduct” as “the conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result” and
“knowingly” with respect to “attendant circumstance” as an awareness that “such circumstances
exist”).
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value;382 wrongful intent appears to relate to conduct (the act of destroying
the evidence).383 As a result, one may have wrongful intent without having
knowledge that lost or destroyed evidence has exculpatory value.
Conversely, one may have knowledge that evidence has exculpatory value
without intending that it be destroyed.
An even more fundamental problem characterizes the knowledge
requirement: it is incongruous and unduly burdensome with respect to
evidence that was never tested. It is incongruous in that Youngblood
addresses the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence but defines bad faith
in terms of knowledge of the evidence’s exculpatory value.384 But how can
one know the exculpatory value of evidence that was untested? By
definition, such evidence is, at most, potentially exculpatory.385 This, in
turn, imposes a formidable burden upon any accused who alleges a
Youngblood violation. As Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent, the
evidence’s loss deprives the defendant of the opportunity to establish its
constitutional materiality. In short, the state “has ‘interfere[d] with the
accused’s ability to present a defense by imposing on him a requirement
which the government’s own actions have rendered impossible to
fulfill.’”386 In requiring the accused to prove that the police knew the
evidence had exculpatory value, Youngblood provides an easy defense to
the police whenever evidence remained untested, for in the absence of
such testing the police will often lack the requisite knowledge.
Regardless of whether bad faith turns on knowledge or intent, the
burden on the defendant is nearly impossible to bear.387 Here, too, Justice
Blackmun anticipated the problem: a defendant would have “inherent
difficulty . . . in obtaining evidence to show a lack of good faith.”388

382. Id. § 1.13(d) (“element of an offense” is defined as conduct, attendant circumstance, or a
result of such conduct).
383. Id. Of course, under the MPC, one can act “purposely” with respect to an attendant
circumstance if one “is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes they
exist.” Id. § 2.02(2)(a)(ii).
384. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56 n.* (1988) (“The presence or absence of bad faith
by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge
of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.”).
385. Id. at 57 (“[W]e think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with
the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could
have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”).
386. Id. at 68–69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 539
(“In effect, Youngblood suggests that no due process violation is conceivable when the nature of the
missing evidence is ambiguous.”).
387. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 19, § 6.8 (describing bad faith standard as “difficult, if not
impossible, to meet”).
388. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Evidence of bad faith is likely to be within the peculiar control of the
police, and an officer unprincipled enough to destroy evidence is unlikely
to chronicle his actions.389 “Short of an admission by the police, it is
unlikely that a defendant would ever be able to make the necessary
showing to establish the required elements for proving bad faith.”390
Moreover, a number of jurisdictions have held that destroying evidence
pursuant to routine procedure is not bad faith.391 Nor, under the facts of
Youngblood itself, does mere negligence suffice to establish bad faith.392
Not surprisingly, perhaps, regardless of whether the test is based on

389. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, supra note 4, at 166.
390. Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1992); see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note
8, at 39–40.
People rarely act of a single mind: conflicting motivations, some proper and others not, often
incite action. Even the most truthful officer may be unable to testify with certainty regarding
his thought processes on an earlier occasion; and a dishonest officer has a strong incentive to
perjure himself if his subjective beliefs will control the admissibility of the evidence.
Realistically, a judge, forced to divine a police officer’s motivations, is likely to give the
officer the benefit of the doubt.
Amsterdam, supra note 141, at 436–37 (“[S]urely the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt when
courts set out to bag the secret motivations of policemen. . . . A subjective purpose to do something
that the applicable legal rules say there is sufficient objective cause to do can be fabricated all too
easily and undetectably.”); Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 539 (noting the “tremendous
burden” the bad faith standard imposes on the defendant).
391. See United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (“‘[D]estruction of
evidence in accordance with an established procedure precludes a finding of bad faith absent other
compelling evidence.’”) (quoting United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 202 (3d Cir. 1993)); State v.
Casselman, 114 P.3d 150, 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005) (finding that police who destroy evidence while
acting according to procedure are, at most, negligent); State v. Schexnayder, 685 So.2d 357, 366 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) (use of “standard operating procedures” in handling evidence not bad faith); Patterson
v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1129 (Md. 1999) (following “standard police procedure” not bad faith); State
v. Hall, 768 P.2d 349, 350 (Nev. 1989) (no bad faith where chemist saved blood sample “for a
reasonable period of time and then disposed of it in accordance with his routine practice and for a
legitimate purpose”); State v. Wittenbarger, 880 P.2d 517, 522 (Wash. 1994) (“[C]ompliance with . . .
established policy regarding the evidence at issue . . . [is] determinative of good faith.”).
Commentators have argued that “[i]n an era of universal use of DNA evidence to both implicate
and exonerate criminal suspects, it would be disingenuous for the prosecutor to claim that anything
short of a truly accidental loss was not strong evidence of bad faith.” Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note
140, at 587; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1567 (“In the contemporary
evidentiary context, failure to develop express guidelines for routine preservation and storage of
physical evidence should now be taken to indicate bad faith on the part of the state in an attempt to
manipulate the pool of available evidence.”). This argument may have even greater force in
jurisdictions that require the preservation of DNA evidence under innocence protection acts or as a
matter of state constitutional law.
392. See, e.g., Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; accord United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 786
(8th Cir. 2004) (negligence is not bad faith); United States v. Wright, 260 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir.
2001) (gross negligence inadequate to establish bad faith); Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004); Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Ky. 1997); State v. Thill, 691 N.W.2d
230, 232 (N.D. 2005); State v. Engesser, 661 N.W.2d 739, 756 (S.D. 2003).
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knowledge or intent, in the two decades since Youngblood was decided,
there are few reported cases in which a court has found bad faith.393
2. Missing Evidence Instruction
There is another disparity in the law that undermines the overall
fairness of the post-Youngblood legal regime. States differ in the
requirements they impose before allowing a missing evidence instruction
to be given. These instructions serve to mitigate the harm occasioned by
the loss of evidence. Indeed, for Justice Stevens, the giving of a missing
evidence instruction allowed Youngblood to turn to his advantage “the
uncertainty as to what the evidence might have proved.”394 That no juror
drew such an inference suggested that the lost evidence was immaterial.395
Nevertheless, an examination of state law reveals that jurisdictions differ
over the showing that must be made before the instruction is given. Many,
if not most, jurisdictions require a showing of bad faith.396 Other

393. See Pena v. State, 166 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting paucity of cases in
which bad faith has been found), vacated, 191 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jones, supra note
15, at 1246 (“In the years since Youngblood, the requirement of demonstrating ‘bad faith’ has proven
to be an almost insurmountable burden in establishing a due process violation based on the destruction
of evidence.”); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 19, § 6.8 (“[O]nly a handful of decisions have found that
the bad faith standard is met.”); Bawden, supra note 19 (“[T]here are a very limited number of cases
where courts have found the presence of bad faith.”). For examples of cases in which bad faith has
been found, see United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 911–14 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cooper,
983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Blackwell, 537 S.E.2d 457, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Stuart
v. State, 907 P.2d 783, 793 (Idaho 1995); State v. McGrone, 798 So.2d 519, 523 (Miss. 2001); State v.
Durnwald, 837 N.E.2d 1234, 1241–42 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); State v. Benson, 788 N.E.2d 693, 696
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003); State v. Jordan, 597 N.E.2d 1165, 1169–71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Jackson, 396 S.E.2d 313, 315–16 (S.C. 1990). There are also a few reported cases in which appellate
courts have found prima facie evidence of bad faith and remanded for further proceedings. See Yarris
v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying Youngblood to post-conviction
destruction of evidence and finding prima facie evidence of bad faith so as to deprive officers of
qualified immunity in § 1983 claim); People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 331 (Ill. 1998) (prima facie
showing of bad faith so as to warrant evidentiary hearing).
394. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 60 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
395. Id.; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1566 (“Youngblood may be read to
suggest that instructions of this sort are necessary to avoid a due process violation when potentially
useful evidence, such as blood that could be tested for DNA identification, has been destroyed.”).
396. For examples of such jurisdictions, see People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 886 (Cal. 1991) (in
absence of bad faith, trial court not required to give missing evidence instruction); State v. Hulbert,
481 N.W.2d 329, 334–35 (Iowa 1992) (in absence of bad faith, failure to give missing evidence
instruction not reversible error); Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1128–29 (Md. 1999) (“The
Youngblood standard logically must extend to the refusal to instruct on the government’s failure to
preserve evidence.”); People v. Davis, 503 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (in absence of bad
faith, missing evidence instruction not warranted); Murray v. State, 849 So.2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.
2003) (same); State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 649 (Neb. 2002) (missing evidence instruction
requires “that the party responsible for the destruction of the evidence did so intentionally and in bad
faith”); Ochoa v. State, 963 P.2d 583, 595 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (“[I]nstruction may be an
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jurisdictions, principally those that reject the bad faith standard as a matter
of state constitutional law, allow the instruction to be given under a lesser
showing.397
In jurisdictions that require a showing of bad faith, the accused faces
the same difficulty as he would in trying to establish bad faith under
Youngblood. The missing evidence instruction is “preclude[d] . . . in
nearly every case unless the State actually admits to bad faith
destruction.”398 The difficulty of establishing bad faith accordingly has a
two-fold effect. Not only will the accused be unable to establish a due
process violation for the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence, but he
will be unable to obtain a curative instruction as well. In jurisdictions with
such an approach, the bad faith standard imposes a double cost upon the
accused, or, to put it another way, confers a double benefit upon the
police.
3. A More Onerous Test
Yet another disparity in the law adds to the incoherence that
characterizes the Youngblood regime. Jurisdictions at both the state and
federal level are unable to agree on the relationship between Trombetta
and Youngblood, as well as the analytical approach to be used in cases
involving lost or destroyed evidence of varying exculpatory value.399 This

appropriate sanction where the defense has made a showing of bad faith.”); State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d
430, 434 (R.I. 1998) (“[A]bsent a showing of bad faith on the part of the state, a lost evidence
instruction is not required each time potentially exculpatory evidence has been lost.”); State v.
Bousum, 663 N.W.2d 257, 264 (S.D. 2003) (“[A]n adverse inference instruction is justified for the
destruction of evidence only where the destruction was intentional and in bad faith.”). See generally
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 233, § 2.8 (“The commentators are unanimous in the judgment that some
form of intent is a prerequisite to drawing the spoliation inference. Many cases which have considered
the issue hold that spoliation requires an intentional act of destruction and that mere negligence is not
enough to warrant drawing an adverse inference.”).
397. See Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557, 569 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (noting that missing
evidence instruction may be given even in absence of bad faith); State v. Lopez, 786 P.2d 959, 964
(Ariz. 1990) (“A Willits instruction is appropriate when the state destroys or loses evidence potentially
helpful to the defendant.”); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 89–90 (Del. 1989) (missing evidence
instruction should have been given when police negligence resulted in loss of evidence); People v.
Camp, 815 N.E.2d 980, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding adverse inference instruction appropriate for
a discovery violation, even though no due process violation found); State v. Barnett, 543 N.W.2d 774,
778 (N.D. 1996) (bad faith or “systemic disregard” of State’s duty to preserve evidence); State v.
Gibney, 825 A.2d 32, 43–44 (Vt. 2003) (adverse inference instruction given despite lack of bad faith);
State v. Paynter, 526 S.E.2d 43, 54 (W.Va. 1999) (upholding cautionary instruction where defendant
failed to establish bad faith).
398. State v. Engesser, 661 N.W.2d 739, 761 (S.D. 2003) (Sabers, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
399. For commentary on these two different approaches, see Bawden, supra note 19, at 346–48
(noting different approaches and arguing that the more onerous one is correct). The Supreme Court has
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results in two different understandings of Youngblood, one even more
onerous than the other.
Some jurisdictions have read Trombetta and Youngblood as creating
separate tests, each of which applies to different types of evidence.400 In
these jurisdictions, Youngblood applies if the evidence is potentially
exculpatory. The defendant must establish bad faith on the part of the
state. In contrast, Trombetta applies if the evidence has “apparent
exculpatory value” and is otherwise unobtainable; no showing of bad faith
is necessary.401 This approach, in effect, establishes a sliding scale in
which the two key variables are bad faith and exculpatory value: the
greater or more apparent the exculpatory value, the less the need to
establish bad faith.
Other jurisdictions use a single test that appears to conflate the
holdings of Trombetta and Youngblood.402 This approach reads
Youngblood as simply adding a bad faith requirement to the standard
articulated in Trombetta. Consequently, it fails to differentiate between
evidence that is potentially exculpatory and evidence that has apparent
exculpatory value; the same test applies to both types of evidence and bad
faith must be demonstrated. A three-part test results in which the

reiterated that the suppression of material exculpatory evidence constitutes a due process violation
regardless of the prosecutor’s good faith. See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (per curiam).
400. See United States v. Wright, 260 F.3d 568, 572–74 (6th Cir. 2001) (Gilman, J., concurring);
United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909–10 (10th Cir. 1994); People v. Farnam, 47 P.3d 988, 1031
(Cal. 2002); People v. Eagen, 892 P.2d 426, 429 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Newberry, 652
N.E.2d 288, 291–92 (Ill. 1995); Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116, 1126 (Nev. 2002); State v. Benson,
788 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 307 (S.C. 2001);
State v. Parker, 647 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Whitney v. State, 99 P.3d 457, 476–77
(Wyo. 2004); see generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 19, § 6.8 (listing cases that adopt this
approach).
401. See supra note 400.
402. For federal cases, see United States. v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d
1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 686 (5th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Chandler, 66
F.3d 1460, 1467 (8th Cir. 1995); see generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 19, § 6.8 (“[M]ost courts
seem to require the defendant to meet both the Youngblood bad faith standard and the Trombetta
exculpatory value standard.”).
For state cases, see Wenzel v. State, 815 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Ark. 1991); Hannah v. State, 599
S.E.2d 177, 180 (Ga. 2004); State v. Kremen, 754 A.2d 964, 968 (Maine 2000); State v. McDonough,
631 N.W.2d 373, 387 (Minn. 2001); Murray v. State, 849 So.2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 2003); State v.
Cox, 879 P.2d 662, 667 (Mont. 1994); State v. Hunt, 483 S.E.2d 417, 421 (N.C. 1997); State v.
Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 1105 (R.I. 2004); State v. Bousum, 663 N.W.2d 257, 262–63 (S.D. 2003);
Simmons v. State, 100 S.W.3d 484, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
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defendant must show (1) the evidence had apparent exculpatory value, (2)
was otherwise unobtainable, and (3) bad faith on the part of the state.403
Perhaps the differing interpretations of Youngblood are no surprise
given its ambiguous relationship with Trombetta.404 Be that as it may, as
hard as it is to establish bad faith, to require enhanced proof of
materiality—that the evidence was not just potentially exculpatory but had
apparent exculpatory value and was otherwise unobtainable—only
increases the burden upon the accused and serves to screen out what few
cases survive the bad faith hurdle.
4. An Unclear Remedy
Jurisdictions have struggled with an additional post-Youngblood issue:
in the event of a due process violation, what is the remedy? The issue is
largely theoretical given the paucity of cases finding bad faith, yet it is
important and demonstrates a startling lack of agreement on a basic
question. On the facts of Youngblood itself, Youngblood sought reversal
of his conviction and dismissal of the charges against him.405 As a result,
one approach holds that the only possible remedy under Youngblood is
dismissal of the charges.406 Nevertheless, Trombetta noted that “when
evidence has been destroyed in violation of the Constitution, the court
must choose between barring further prosecution or suppressing . . . the
State’s most probative evidence.”407 Along those lines, other jurisdictions
allow for possible sanctions ranging from a missing evidence instruction
to the suppression of evidence and dismissal of the indictment.408

403. See supra note 402.
404. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 19, § 6.8 (“Because the Youngblood decision does not
explicitly resolve the status of California v. Trombetta, the relationship between the two decisions is in
some doubt.”).
405. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 52 (1988); State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 592
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51.
406. See State v. Lang, 862 P.2d 235, 245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (construing Youngblood to
require dismissal); Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1992) (“[T]he court is left with an all or
nothing proposition . . . .”); United States v. Day, 697 A.2d 31, 36 (D.C. 1997) (dismissal the
appropriate sanction under Youngblood).
407. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 487 (1984).
408. For federal cases, see United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing
Trombetta for the proposition that the court has the discretion to bar further prosecution or to suppress
the most probative evidence); United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 932–33 (9th Cir. 1993) (based on
the facts of the case, suppression of evidence an inadequate remedy). For state cases, see Stuart v.
State, 907 P.2d 783, 793 (Idaho 1995) (“In a criminal case, application of a favorable inference under
the spoliation doctrine is the appropriate remedy for a Youngblood due process violation.”); State v.
Rains, 735 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (upholding suppression of evidence for due process
violation).
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III. IN DEFENSE OF YOUNGBLOOD
In spite of the critique that can be made of Youngblood, there is an
argument on its behalf. Bad facts do not always result in bad law;
Youngblood’s innocence does not mean that the doctrine founded on his
conviction is, of necessity, indefensible. This defense stresses an
instrumental conception of due process and the costs associated with
recognizing a broader duty to preserve evidence. Although developments
in state law may have eroded Youngblood, for a number of reasons they do
not compel its reversal. Moreover, principles of federalism counsel
restraint in setting aside Youngblood, for states would be required to
follow a rule of law interpreting the Due Process Clause. This would preempt any experimentation at the state level.
First, even though ten states have rejected Youngblood’s bad faith
standard in interpreting due process under their constitutions, the fact
remains that most states have reached a contrary result. They have adopted
Youngblood in interpreting due process under their own constitutions.409
For those states, at least, Youngblood has proven to be an acceptable rule
of law. If anything, it may be the approach that “has evolved into a
baseline for due process.”410
Second, one might argue that Youngblood strikes the appropriate
balance between fairness to the accused and society’s interest in public
safety. This interest includes the need for effective law enforcement and
avoiding the imposition of an undue burden upon the state. As Justice
Stevens noted, the police surely have an incentive to preserve evidence411:
“In cases such as this, even without a prophylactic sanction such as
dismissal of the indictment, the state has a strong incentive to preserve the
evidence.”412 Advances in forensic DNA typing have only increased the
power of this incentive.
Third, the bad faith requirement allows sanctions to be imposed in the
most egregious cases. In other cases, a defendant who cannot establish bad
faith is hardly rendered defenseless. The existing legal regime can mitigate
Youngblood’s potential harshness.413 Before trial, the defense may be able

409. See Dinger, supra note 4, at 343 n.95 (listing state court decisions following Youngblood).
410. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006).
411. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
412. Id.
413. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 490 & n.11 (in evaluating due process claim, taking into account
availability of cross examination and other procedures that protect accused); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 339 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In a procedural due process claim, it is not the

298

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:241

to seek sanctions under local discovery rules.414 At trial, through vigorous
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the presentation of evidence
in the defense case, and opening and closing argument, the defense ought
to be able to hammer home the significance of lost evidence. A judge
might also issue a missing evidence instruction to the jury. In short,
zealous advocacy may be enough to create a reasonable doubt that results
in an acquittal, even in the absence of a due process violation.
Fourth, Youngblood’s bright-line test has the advantage of being easy
to apply and minimizes the need for protracted pre-trial evidentiary
hearings. If Youngblood were overturned, numerous difficult line-drawing
issues would arise, the types of issues that Justice Blackmun sought to
resolve with his proposed four-part test. Must evidence be preserved in all
cases, whatever the crime, or only with respect to more serious crimes?
What type of evidence would be covered by the new rule? Would it be
DNA evidence or all types of physical evidence? Does the duty to preserve
imply a duty to collect evidence at a crime scene?415 Could police

deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty
without due process of law—without adequate procedures.”).
414. For example, Federal Rule Of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) provides that:
Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy
or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or
places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s
possession, custody, or control and: (i) the item is material in preparing the defense; (ii) the
government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained
from or belongs to the defendant.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). Rule 16 has been influential at the state level, and many states have
adopted discovery rules based on it. 2 NANCY HOLLANDER ET AL., WHARTON’S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 12:6 (14th ed. 2005). Many states and the District of Columbia have rules that require
the preservation of certain types of evidence. See Abdulbaqui v. State, 728 P.2d 1211, 1217 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1986); Martinez v. United States, 762 A.2d 931, 934 (D.C. 2000); People v. Newberry, 652
N.E.2d 288, 292 (Ill. 1995); State v. Antwine, 636 P.2d 208, 210 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Tanner, 448 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Neb. 1989) State v. Robinson, 488 S.E.2d 174, 180 (N.C. 1997); State
v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 612 (N.D. 1993); State v. Bousum, 663 N.W.2d 257, 262 (S.D. 2003).
Similarly, the Jencks Act may also provide relief in some cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). The Act
requires the government to produce statements of a witness to the defense. Failure to produce the
statements may result in sanctions, including striking the witness’s testimony or a mistrial. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(d).
The destruction of evidence may also be a crime, but these laws typically require proof of specific
intent to obstruct a proceeding. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 19, § 5.1. One commentator has
suggested that state tampering with evidence laws may apply to the willful destruction of evidence but
she discounts the likelihood of prosecution. See Jones, supra note 15, at 1259–60. In addition,
prosecution of the wrongdoer is an option for the state, not a remedy for the accused. Id. at 1260.
415. Some courts have already grappled with these questions. See Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956,
960 (Del. 1992); State v. Ware, 881 P.2d 679, 683–85 (N.M. 1994) (police have no general duty to
collect all potential evidence from a crime scene, but “this rule is not absolute”); State v. Steffes, 500
N.W.2d 608, 612 (N.D. 1993) (“Police generally have no duty to collect evidence for the defense.”);
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negligence in failing to collect evidence at a crime scene give rise to a due
process claim? How long would the duty to preserve last? Would due
process require the post-conviction preservation of evidence?416 Those
questions may prove increasingly difficult to answer as DNA evidence is
successfully collected and tested from an ever greater variety of objects
and surfaces.417
Whatever the parameters of the rule, creating a broader duty to
preserve evidence would undoubtedly impose greater costs upon the police
and the courts. At a time of scarce public resources, police departments
around the United States would be forced to deal with the expense
associated with collecting and storing evidence in a plethora of cases.
Judicial resources would also be required. Undoubtedly, setting aside
Youngblood and adopting a balancing test would spawn litigation that
would require courts to determine on an ad hoc basis whether the loss of
evidence resulted in a due process violation. Courts would also be pressed
to define the parameters of the duty to preserve evidence.
Fifth, one cannot overlook federalism concerns. “[P]reventing and
dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the
Federal Government, and . . . we should not lightly construe the
Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the
individual States.”418 Moreover, states can and should be laboratories for
experimentation.419 A reversal of Youngblood would create a constitutional
rule pre-empting any experimentation at the state level in which states,
through statutes and interpretations of their own constitutions, are
empowered to afford their citizens different and greater protections than
those required by the U.S. Constitution. This pre-emption would be

March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 716 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he due process clause has never
required officers to undertake a state-of-the-art investigation of all reported crimes.”).
416. See supra note 359.
417. Gautam Naik, The Gene Police, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23–24, 2008, at A1 (reporting that
Britain’s Forensic Science Service “can isolate DNA profiles from an object such as a light switch,
that has been touched by many people and could contain dozens of different DNA sequences”).
418. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977). See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735,
749 (2006) (noting reluctance “to limit the traditional recognition of a State’s capacity to define crimes
and defenses”); Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 491 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Rules concerning
preservation of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional law.”).
419. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 307–08 (2d ed.
2002); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“Courts and commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 states serve as
laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas.”); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).

300

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:241

particularly improvident when there is no clear consensus at the state level
that Youngblood is inconsistent with prevailing notions of fundamental
fairness to the accused. States should retain the option of being able to
pass laws that afford enhanced procedural protection to their criminal
defendants and that explicitly impose a duty to preserve evidence.
Finally, innocence protection acts do not necessarily undermine
Youngblood’s rationale. In general, they apply to biological material
gathered in connection with the prosecution of certain types of serious
crime.420 In contrast, Youngblood extends to all types of evidence and
crime. Similarly, innocence protection acts apply post-conviction;421
Youngblood applies pre-conviction. There is arguably a rational basis to
distinguish between pre- and post-conviction duties to preserve evidence.
The post-conviction duty creates a fail-safe mechanism of sorts to ensure
that the wrongfully convicted have recourse. The conviction serves as a
screening device to determine, when, as a statutory matter, the duty to
preserve is triggered. A broader duty—one that applies to all evidence
collected after the commission of a crime—would impose far greater costs
on the state and place an undue burden on the police.
IV. RESOLUTION: APPLICATION OF THE CASEY FACTORS
On balance, despite the arguments in defense of Youngblood,
subsequent developments have so eroded its essential rationale that it no
longer merits stare decisis effect. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Supreme Court noted that “the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable
command,’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.”422 The
Court discussed five factors to consider in determining whether precedent
should be set aside: (1) whether the rule has proven to be “unworkable”;423
(2) whether the rule can be changed without “serious inequity to those
who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society
governed by it”;424 (3) whether there have been changes in the law since
the case was decided that have rendered the rule a “doctrinal anachronism

420. For examples of laws that apply to non-biological evidence, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12104(a) (2005) (“any physical evidence”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-4(a) (2004) (“any physical
evidence . . . likely to contain forensic evidence, including but not limited to, fingerprints or biological
material”). It is important to note that “the vast majority of criminal cases lack . . . biological
evidence.” Garrett, supra note 3, at 116.
421. See supra note 351 for exceptions to this general rule.
422. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–11
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
423. Id. at 855.
424. Id.
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discounted by society”;425 (4) whether the factual premises for the decision
“have so far changed . . . as to render its central holding somehow
irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed”;426 and (5)
whether setting aside the precedent would call into question the Court’s
legitimacy.427 An application of those factors demonstrates that
Youngblood ought to be overruled.
A. Factual Change
A powerful argument in favor of setting aside Youngblood arises from
factual changes—advances in forensic science—that have occurred in the
twenty years since Youngblood was decided. The advances have been
nothing short of extraordinary. They render Youngblood’s central holding
“unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.”428 On the facts of
Youngblood, given the science of the time, there was a chance that prompt
testing might have exculpated Youngblood, but there was also a
significant chance, even under the best of circumstances, that it would not.
Issuing a missing evidence instruction to counteract the loss of evidence
that was, perhaps, inconclusive may have seemed an acceptable bargain at
the time. But unlike two decades ago, we know today that the semen
samples could exculpate the accused to a scientific certainty. Thus, the due
process calculus must change.
Scientific advances affect the analysis in other ways as well. In 1988,
when Youngblood was decided, forensic DNA typing was in its early
stages. The Court could only speculate as to its reach.429 DNA testing was
time-consuming and costly.430 The first generation DNA test—multi locus
restriction fragment length polymorphism—is no longer used.431 Unlike
the visual comparisons used in the past, matches are now based on
computerized analysis.432 Samples once too degraded to be tested can now

425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 865–69.
428. Id. at 855.
429. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 70 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting “the
potential for this type of evidence”). At oral argument, Youngblood’s counsel also alluded to advances
in forensic testing that made the testing conclusive in a way it was not in the past. See Transcript of
Respondent’s Oral Argument, supra note 73.
430. BUTLER, supra note 319, at 11 (“[T]he ability of laboratories to perform DNA typing
methods has improved dramatically along a similar timeline [as personal computers] due to rapid
progress in the areas of biology, technology, and understanding of genetic theories.”).
431. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 304, at 10.
432. Id. at 29–30.
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be analyzed, and far smaller amounts of biological material are needed.433
As demonstrated by the facts of Youngblood, a swab that could not be
reliably tested in 1984 resulted in exoneration in 2000 and the actual
perpetrator’s conviction. Moreover, although it is true that Youngblood
applies to all types of evidence, and not just to DNA evidence, the
development of forensic DNA typing poses the greatest challenge to its
legitimacy.
B. Legal Change
Judicial and legislative changes in the law also militate against
Youngblood. Arguably, it has become a “doctrinal anachronism,” undercut
by significant changes in state and federal law. We now have the benefit of
two decades worth of post-Youngblood law. Ten states have rejected
Youngblood’s bad faith standard in interpreting due process under their
constitutions. Almost all states and the federal government have passed
innocence protection acts, which explicitly recognize the power of DNA
testing to right wrongful convictions and to bring about more just and
reliable results. What matters is fairness to the accused, not an officer’s
subjective state of mind in losing evidence. Thirty-three states, the federal
government, and the District of Columbia require the preservation of
evidence either upon conviction or upon the defendant’s motion.434 This
represents an implicit repudiation of Youngblood in a post-conviction
context. Under Youngblood, if states need not preserve evidence preconviction, they surely need not preserve it post-conviction when the
presumption of innocence has been cast aside. The overwhelming passage
of innocence protection acts may fairly be viewed as an evolving norm of
due process that erodes Youngblood’s rationale.435

433. BUTLER, supra note 319, at 80.
434. See supra notes 16, 354–55.
435. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360 (1996) (Oklahoma’s presumption of
competency unless defendant proved otherwise by clear and convincing evidence violated due process,
in part because it was inconsistent with “[c]ontemporary practice”); Israel, supra note 198, at 361–67
(describing Supreme Court precedent that views due process as an “evolving concept”), Id. at 413–16
(considering contemporary practice and consensus). Beyond the scope of this Article is whether the
more demanding fundamental fairness approach of Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), or the
balancing approach of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), should be applied to determine the
requirements of due process. With respect to post-conviction access to DNA evidence, some courts
have applied the Mathews standard. See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2007)
(remand to district court based on application of Mathews); Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340–41
(11th Cir. 2006) (finding no due process right under a Mathews balancing); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d
298, 315 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that
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C. Unworkability
If Youngblood is not “unworkable” per se, at a minimum, it is deeply
flawed. First, Youngblood has the wrong focus. As between competing
visions of due process, an instrumental focus on deterring official
misconduct should not be allowed to trump adjudicative fairness. There is
a place for both visions, but the paramount concern of the Due Process
Clause must be on ensuring fairness to the accused through reliable fact
finding that protects the innocent from wrongful conviction.436
Youngblood, in contrast, focuses exclusively on an officer’s subjective
state of mind. The presence or absence of bad faith is dispositive;
prejudice to the accused is disregarded, even if the evidence could have
led to his exoneration.437 The harm to the accused is the same regardless of
the officer’s state of mind.438 Youngblood’s cramped view of due process
cannot stand if requiring the preservation of evidence is viewed as a matter
of ensuring fairness to the accused instead of preventing police
misconduct.
Second, Youngblood fails to satisfy even its instrumental rationale; it
overestimates its benefits and underestimates its costs. On the one hand,
Youngblood provides little prophylactic value in deterring police
misconduct. In a sense, it works too well; it prevents courts from granting
relief to the accused. It is almost impossible to establish bad faith, and
there are few reported cases in which a due process violation has been
found. On the other hand, Youngblood imposes significant costs. Its overly
deferential standard may encourage sloppy police work, for there are no

Mathews applies but reaching same result under Medina to recognize right to post-conviction access to
DNA evidence).
436. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 140, at 588–89 (“The central and common ground for
declaring certain rights fundamental under the Due Process Clause is the protection those rights
provide against conviction of innocent persons.”); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, supra note 4, at
165 (“[T]he Court’s precedents emphasize that bad faith is wholly irrelevant to the defendant’s right to
a fair trial.”); Lembke, supra note 4, at 1238 (in this area of the law, “fairness to the defendant is the
primary concern”); Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 529 (“Youngblood’s bad faith test bypasses
the constitutionally required task of assessing the harm to the defendant when law enforcement
officials act negligently.”).
437. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (“[U]nless a criminal defendant can
show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.”).
438. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“‘Deprivation’
. . . identifies, not the actor’s state of mind, but the victim’s infringement or loss. The harm to . . . [an
individual] is the same whether . . . [the official acts] negligently, recklessly, or intentionally . . . . In
each instance, the . . . [individual] is losing—being ‘deprived’ of—an aspect of liberty as the result, in
part, of a form of state action.”); Lembke, supra note 4, at 1238 (arguing that “fairness to the
defendant is the primary concern,” not deterrence of police misconduct).
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due process consequences when the police lose potentially exculpatory
evidence in a negligent or reckless manner.439 This unremediated loss of
evidence, in turn, undermines the reliability of the fact-finding process, as
well as public confidence in adjudications of guilt. To the extent that
Youngblood leads to wrongful conviction, it exacts a terrible double cost.
One cost is to the individual wrongfully convicted. Another cost is to
society, for the actual perpetrator remains at large, as happened in
Youngblood itself.440
Third, an examination of two decades worth of post-Youngblood case
law reveals startling inconsistencies in its interpretation by courts across
the United States. Substantial disparities exist on a number of fundamental
issues, including the meaning of bad faith, whether evidence need only be
potentially exculpatory or possess apparent exculpatory value, and what
remedy follows a due process violation.
Fourth, Youngblood is simply too categorical in its approach. It fails to
differentiate between the seriousness of charges facing an accused and the
nature of the potentially exculpatory evidence.441 The bad faith standard
fails to distinguish between a misdemeanor drunk driving charge or a
capital case; it applies equally to both cases in spite of the disparity in
potential punishment. Nor does Youngblood adequately differentiate
among types of evidence; not all evidence has the same value or power to
inculpate or exculpate to a scientific certainty. Few forms of forensic
testing are as precise as DNA typing. For that matter, in focusing on bad
faith alone, Youngblood fails to allow for developments in forensic science
that may enhance the probative value of certain types of evidence.
Fifth, that other potential remedies may be available to the accused—
including discovery sanctions, argument to the jury, cross-examination,
and a missing evidence instruction—is insufficient. Youngblood should
stand or fall on its own. Its merit is at issue, not whether its severity or
shortcoming can be mitigated by the happenstance of other rules.
Moreover, depending on the facts of the case and the laws of a particular

439. See Pena v. State, 166 S.W.3d 274, 281 (Tex. App. 2005), vacated, 191 S.W.3d 133 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (theorizing that “the Youngblood standard may have contributed to the negligent
actions of . . . [several Texas] crime labs”); Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1571 (noting
“incentives for the state to destroy or avoid preserving physical evidence”).
440. See Lembke, supra note 4, at 1239–40 (“[E]ncouraging police to take great care in preserving
potentially exculpatory evidence has a tremendous payoff for innocent defendants at the margin who
have no other way to prove their innocence. In addition, society benefits because governmental
resources are not expended on the imprisonment of an innocent defendant.”).
441. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, supra note 4, at 164–65 (arguing that bad faith standard
is underinclusive and overinclusive).
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jurisdiction, other potential remedies for the loss of evidence may be
illusory. Discovery sanctions may not be available;442 presumably, this
explains why many of the reported cases involving Youngblood claims
only raise a due process challenge. Many jurisdictions require a showing
of bad faith before a missing evidence instruction can be granted. Cross
examination and jury argument may not cure the extent of the prejudice
suffered by the accused. Indeed, in Youngblood, those measures plus a
missing evidence instruction were insufficient to safeguard Youngblood’s
liberty. When a heinous crime is charged, the jury may unduly discount
the loss of evidence against the seriousness of the charges out of fear of
letting a monster go free.443
Finally, Youngblood may detract from the law’s normative message.
Rules of law send such messages, especially, perhaps, when the rule is
based on a Supreme Court decision that interprets the Due Process

442. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the relationship between discovery rules
and Youngblood. The Jencks Act, for example, only applies to “statements” by a witness. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (2000). Nor does Rule 16 on its face create a general, undifferentiated duty to preserve all
evidence in a case. Under Rule 16(a), the defendant has the ability to inspect, copy, or photograph
evidence “material” to the preparation of the defense. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D)(i). To do this,
however, the defendant must first make “a request,” and the evidence must be in the “possession,
custody, or control of the government.” Id. See also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461–63
(1996). Lower federal courts have interpreted this to mean that the defendant must first make a specific
prima facie showing of materiality—i.e., that the evidence is helpful to the defense. See United States
v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1203 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1208 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thompson, 944
F.2d 1331, 1341 (7th Cir. 1991); see generally 25 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 616.05[1][b] (3d ed. 2007). One court has held that Rule 16 does not apply to evidence
destroyed prior to indictment, for it is no longer in the possession, custody, or control of the
government. See United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999). A defense request
under Rule 16 also triggers a reciprocal discovery obligation “upon government request.” FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(b)(1). In some jurisdictions, state courts have conflated Youngblood with the applicable
discovery rule so that the defendant must show that the police acted in bad faith in destroying evidence
to establish a violation of the rule. See State v. Robinson, 488 S.E.2d 174, 180–81 (N.C. 1997)
(applying bad faith standard to determine if state discovery rule violated by loss of evidence); State v.
Bousum, 663 N.W.2d 257, 262 (S.D. 2003) (same).
443. For an illustration of this point, see State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252 (Idaho 1989). In Fain, the
defendant was charged with kidnapping, molesting, and killing a nine-year-old child. Id. at 254. The
state failed to preserve swabs of the victim’s body, and the defendant moved to dismiss charges. Id. at
257–59. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 259. Fain was subsequently convicted and sentenced
to death. Id. at 254. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the conviction, applying a balancing test to hold
that no due process violation had occurred. Id. at 266–67. After spending seventeen years on death
row, Fain was exonerated when DNA evidence showed that someone else had committed the crime.
Betsy Z. Russell, Panel Backs Bill to Restore Death Penalty, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, Jan. 18, 2003, at
A1. Cf. House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2079 (2006) (“Law and society, as they ought to do, demand
accountability when a sexual offense has been committed . . . .”); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349
(1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Any judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of forms they
are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.”).
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Clause.444 What message is sent when the accused has no claim for relief
for the loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence? Or, to put it
another way, why privilege the police over the accused in the name of due
process, which, after all, is supposed to represent fundamental fairness?445
An inconsistency has developed in the law’s message. Youngblood has the
practical effect of shielding police conduct in the absence of bad faith;
innocence protection acts seek to free the wrongfully convicted even if the
police acted in good faith. Many of those laws also require the postconviction preservation of evidence, a requirement not imposed preconviction under Youngblood when the evidence might help prevent a
wrongful conviction in the first instance. Indeed, to the extent Youngblood
fails to ensure the preservation of evidence, it undercuts the very purpose
of the innocence protection acts, which is to afford access to biological
material for post-conviction DNA testing.
D. Detrimental Reliance
Nor has there been such reliance on Youngblood that the cost of its
repudiation would be excessive. Youngblood, after all, is not deeply rooted
in American jurisprudence. Rather, it was an innovation of the Rehnquist
Court that trumped the law prevailing in most jurisdictions (including the
federal courts of appeals), which used a multi-factor balancing test to
determine if the loss of evidence resulted in a due process violation.446 In
cases involving the constitutional right of access to evidence, Youngblood
also shifted the focus from fairness to the accused, to an exclusive
examination of the officer’s subjective intent. This, too, broke with
precedent.447
Moreover, to the extent police already have an incentive to preserve
evidence, a reversal of Youngblood would impose little additional burden
upon them. In states that have rejected Youngblood’s bad faith standard as
a matter of state constitutional law, the police are already required to
preserve evidence.448 Most innocence protection acts require the post-

444. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786 (1970) (noting the power of Supreme Court pronouncements “to
shake the assembled faithful with awful tremors of exultation and loathing”).
445. See Bell, 126 S. Ct. at 2732; Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996); Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977).
446. See supra note 232.
447. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
448. See supra note 17.
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conviction preservation of DNA evidence. Even in states that follow
Youngblood, advances in forensic science, as well as the law of spoliation
and various discovery rules, create a general incentive for the police to
preserve physical evidence. A reversal of Youngblood would only
strengthen pre-existing incentives. In short, a return to the pre-Youngblood
legal regime would not impose a “special hardship” or “add inequity to the
cost of repudiation.”449
Federalism concerns should not preclude a reversal of Youngblood. In
deciding Youngblood, the Court, in effect, imposed its view of due process
on the states. Many states follow the lead of the Supreme Court in
interpreting due process under their own constitutions.450 Youngblood
supplanted the balancing test used in many states, and a reversal of
Youngblood would presumably allow a return to the status quo ante. There
must also be limits to the deference shown states in matters of criminal
law or to the desire to allow states to serve as laboratories for
experimentation.451 Otherwise, state laws could never be found
unconstitutional; the Bill of Rights would not have been incorporated
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to

449. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
450. 1 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.11, at 715 (1999) (“[W]hen state courts
turned to their state constitutions, the vast majority of the rulings (by a 2–1 ratio) read the state
guarantee as imposing the same standard as the Supreme Court had adopted under a counterpart
federal guarantee.”) (citing BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 160–61 (1995));
Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court “Revolution”, 74 JUDICATURE 190, 194
(1991) (“[A]doptionism is the dominant feature of state constitutional law.”). For specific examples of
states following the Supreme Court’s view of due process in interpreting state constitutions, see Stoker
v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he Indiana Due Course of Law requirement
is analogous to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal quotations omitted);
State v. Finley, 42 P.3d 723, 728 (Kan. 2002) (“The constitutional rights granted an accused under our
state constitution are coextensive with those rights granted an accused under the United States
Constitution.”); State v. Anderson, 724 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Me. 1999) (“This Court has held repeatedly
that due process under the Maine Constitution provides no greater protection to individuals than does
due process under the United States Constitution.”); State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 647 (Neb. 2002)
(“Because the due process requirements of Nebraska’s Constitution are similar to those of the federal
Constitution, we apply the same analysis to . . . [the] state and federal constitutional claims.”). Other
states have adopted Youngblood in interpreting the due process provisions of their own constitutions.
See State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1157–58 (Ariz. 1993); People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875,
887 (Ill. 1997); State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d 430, 433 (R.I. 1998); State v. Wittenbarger, 880 P.2d 517,
524 (Wash. 1994). At least one state does not have a due process provision in its constitution and, as a
result, relies upon Youngblood’s view of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. See State v.
Zinsli, 966 P.2d 1200, 1202 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). In other areas of constitutional criminal
procedure, state courts have abandoned their precedent to follow the lead of the Supreme Court. See
Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1429, 1447 (2002) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court’s decisions sometimes have the effect of
ice. They chill growth and movement in the states.”).
451. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 140, at 612 (“[T]he freedom of states to structure their
criminal processes is not unbounded.”).
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the states.452 Constitutional criminal procedure would be frozen in place,
even when a state’s practice was unsound and unfair. Indeed, in an Eighth
Amendment context, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that an
evolving consensus in state law may require a change in federal
constitutional law.453 The same is true for the Due Process Clause.454
E. Court’s Legitimacy
This is not a case in which a reversal of precedent would call into
question the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. The Court in no sense is “under
fire” for its decision in Youngblood.455 Nor could anyone accuse the Court
of “surrender[ing] to political pressure.”456 In fact, because of
developments in forensic science not available when Youngblood was
decided, as well as concurrent developments in state law that reject
Youngblood on the one hand and enact innocence protection acts on the
other, a decision to set aside Youngblood could hardly be viewed as
unprincipled. On the contrary, doing so would be consistent with the
Court’s recognition that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command”457
and would demonstrate fidelity to one of the most basic constitutional
principles of all: due process of law.
In reversing Youngblood, the Court need not strain to find an
alternative. One option would be Justice Stevens’s conclusion that even in
the absence of bad faith the loss or destruction of evidence may be “so
critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.”458

452. All but five provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to the states: (1) the Second Amendment “right to
bear arms”; (2) the Third Amendment right not to have soldiers quartered in one’s home; (3) the Fifth
Amendment right to grand jury indictment in criminal cases; (4) the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial in civil cases; and (5) the Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive fines. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 419, at 504–05.
453. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–68 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits
execution of juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002) (Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution of individuals with mental retardation).
454. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2719–22 (2006) (rejecting challenge to state law based
on examination of common law and state statutes for “no particular formulation has evolved into a
baseline for due process” ); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360–61 (1996) (striking down state
law as violating Due Process Clause, because it was contrary to common law practice and followed by
only four States); see generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 449, § 2.7(b) (“Where a very strong
contemporary consensus rejects a procedure (i.e., where all but a few states reject it), and that rejection
follows a position well established at common law, that consensus will contribute significantly to the
case against the procedure.”).
455. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 854.
458. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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This approach fashions a safety net of sorts but leaves for another day the
development of standards to determine when the loss or destruction of
evidence renders a trial unfair.
Another possibility would be Justice Blackmun’s proposal, which
cabins the duty to preserve to cases in which the evidence (1) is “clearly
relevant,” (2) embodies an “immutable characteristic of the assailant,” and
(3) is of a type “likely to be independently exculpatory.”459 This approach
takes into account the burden on the police in preserving evidence.460
While it has the virtue of abandoning the bad faith requirement and of
being tailored to cover advances in forensic DNA typing, the duty it
creates may be too narrow insofar as the evidence protected must embody
an immutable characteristic of the accused. This approach appears to be
limited to DNA evidence and other unique physical identifiers. Depending
on the circumstances of the case, some evidence may be exculpatory
without reflecting such a trait.
Perhaps, then, the most reasonable approach of all would simply return
to the multi-factor balancing test commonly used by state and federal
courts before Youngblood. Then-Judge Kennedy’s approach in Loud Hawk
is as sound as any in that it balances “the quality of the Government’s
conduct and the degree of prejudice to the accused.”461 Indeed, courts are
well suited for such inquiries, as they are called upon to engage in a
similar type of balancing in deciding whether to impose sanctions for
discovery violations under Rule 16.462 Under this approach, courts would
also have the discretion to fashion the appropriate remedy given the
circumstances of the case; dismissal would not be the only possibility.
CONCLUSION
Two decades ago the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Youngblood.
The presence or absence of bad faith became dispositive in determining
whether the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence violated due process.

459. Id. at 70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
460. Id. at 71.
461. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the result and writing majority opinion on the issue). See also Lembke, supra note 4, at 1215
(proposing a test that examines materiality and police culpability); Dinger, supra note 4, at 383
(advocating adoption of a balancing test).
462. Two key factors include the reasons for the government’s failure to disclose, including
whether the government acted intentionally or in bad faith, and the extent of prejudice to the accused.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note; United States v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920, 927 (6th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 1997); see generally 36 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 355–57 (2007).
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This test overrode the balancing approach then being used in both state
and federal courts. More than that, in crafting Youngblood, the Court
disregarded important principles in its own precedent that had focused on
materiality and prejudice to the accused, not the officer’s subjective state
of mind. As between two competing visions of due process,
instrumentalism trumped adjudicative fairness; the emphasis shifted from
the individual to the state and from furthering fairness to the accused to
punishing the state for official misconduct.
The passage of time has not treated Youngblood kindly either on the
facts of the case or as a doctrinal matter. As a factual matter, Youngblood
was innocent, and the actual perpetrator subsequently convicted. As a
doctrinal matter, Youngblood was decided on the cusp of a revolution in
forensic science. Dramatic advances in forensic DNA typing have
undermined Youngblood’s assumption that, as a matter of due process, the
officer’s subjective state of mind should matter more than materiality and
prejudice to the accused when potentially exculpatory evidence is lost.
Almost all states and the federal government have recognized the power of
DNA testing and, in an implicit repudiation of Youngblood, have enacted
innocence protection acts, many of which impose a duty to preserve DNA
evidence.
Youngblood has also spawned incoherence among the state and federal
courts that have tried to make sense of it. Disparities exist on such
fundamental issues as the definition of “bad faith,” whether the evidence
must be potentially exculpatory or, in a nod to Trombetta, possess
apparent exculpatory value and be otherwise unobtainable, and what the
remedy is for a due process violation. Of course, the issue of remedy is
largely theoretical. No matter how Youngblood is interpreted, bad faith is
nearly impossible to prove.
The long arc of a constitutional doctrine is not always easy to trace.
Some are enduring and deservedly so; they withstand the test of time.
Marbury v. Madison463 and McCulloch v. Maryland,464 for example, are
deeply embedded within our constitutional order. Other constitutional
doctrines, however well intentioned, do not hold up when tested by the
complexities of fact patterns that arise in countless cases across the United
States.465 Societal changes, or changes in the factual or legal foundations

463. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
464. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
465. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 n.13 (1993) (“‘The
work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another ephemeral . . . . In the endless process of
testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is
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of a doctrine, often prompt a critical re-examination. Or the doctrine itself
may prove to be unworkable. In some instances, the doctrine itself must be
refined; in others, it must be abandoned. Youngblood falls into the latter
category. When it comes to the constitutional right of access to evidence,
it is time to end Youngblood’s myopic focus on bad faith and
instrumentalism, to the detriment of an alternative vision of due process
that promotes adjudicative fairness.

pure and sound and fine.’”) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
178, 179 (1921)).

